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Lake Tahoe, the Truckee River, and
Pyramid Lake: the Past, Present, and
Future of Interstate Water Issues
John Kramer*
In the opinion of the Conservation Commission-which is shared
by the State Water Commission-the waters of Lake Tahoe are
too valuable an asset, from every point of view, to permit them
to be diverted, without established limit, into any other state. For,
if they are to be so diverted, it will be difficult, if not impossible
for California to recover her proper share of them. The Conser-
vation Commission, therefore, recommends as strongly as it can,
that this State bring suit, before the Supreme Court of the United
States, against the State of Nevada to have the waters of Lake
Tahoe equitably apportioned to and between the two states, so
that, by prescription or otherwise, the people of. California may
not be deprived of their present, just, legal, equitable and proper
share in the waters of the Lake.'
The melt waters from snows falling mainly in California drain
naturally into Lake Tahoe, which straddles the California-Nevada
boundary. Waters from Lake Tahoe flow down the Truckee River
to the confluence with the Little Truckee River at a point below
the town of Truckee. From there, the River flows through Reno,
* John Kramer is an attorney with the California Department of Water Resources. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author and in no way reflect the views, opinions
or policies of the Department of Water Resources, or any other agency of the State of
California.
1. Report of the Conservation Commission of the State of California, at 82 (transmitted
to the Governor and Legislature January 1, 1913). The Conservation Commission recommended
adoption of the Water Commission Act, which is the predecessor of California's current laws
governing appropriation and beneficial use of water.
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Nevada to its end at Pyramid Lake which has no natural outlet.
Even after more than a century of effort, the problem of appor-
tionment of its waters between the two states has never been
resolved.
Legal and administrative problems for the Truckee River are
complicated by other geographic details. Runoff from the Lake
Tahoe Basin and the Truckee River Basin is controlled by dams at
Lake Tahoe, Fallen Leaf Lake, Echo lake, Marlette Lake, Donner
Lake and Independence Lake. It is also controlled by four reservoirs,
Prosser Creek, Boca and Stampede Reservoirs, and Martis Creek
Reservoir (which is used only to impound flood waters). The Truckee
River is the principal water supply for the Reno-Sparks metropolitan
area. Derby Dam, located between Reno and Wadsworth, diverts
Truckee River water over to the federal Newlands Project near
Fallon. Pyramid Lake is entirely within the Pyramid Lake Indian
Reservation. Two species of fish that live in the Lake are listed
under the federal Endangered Species Act, the threatened Lahontan
Cutthroat Trout and the endangered Cui-ui.
Californians and Nevadans had argued over the waters of Lake
Tahoe and the Truckee River for nearly forty years before the
Conservation Commission recommended in 1913 that they be eq-
uitably apportioned. Another forty years would pass before serious
efforts began to achieve a division of the waters between the two
states. By 1970, thirteen years of negotiation resulted in adoption
of the California-Nevada Interstate Compact.2 This Compact would
allocate the interstate waters of Lake Tahoe, the Truckee River,
and the Carson and Walker Rivers to the two states. However,
continuing controversy over the terms of the Compact, particularly
its effect on Federal and Indian claims to water within Nevada, has
thwarted obtaining the consent and approval of Congress. 3 The
Compact languished before Congress for fourteen years before
hearings in 1985 and 1986 demonstrated that the consent and
approval of Congress could not be obtained.
In 1988, seventy-five years after the California Conservation
Commission recommended a Supreme Court lawsuit, continuing
2. The California-Nevada Interstate Compact was ratified by the Nevada Legislature in
1969 [hereinafter Interstate Compact]. Acts 1969, pp. 69, 1259. It was ratified by the California
Legislature in 1970, with certain modifications. 1970 Cal. Stat. ch. 1480, sec. 1, at 2924. The
Nevada Legislature concurred in the modifications in 1971. See CAL. WATER CODE § 5976
(West 1971); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 538.600 (Michie 1986) (text of Compact).
3. The consent and approval of Congress is required by United States Constitution,
article I, section 10, clause 3.
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controversy and uncertainty remain over competing claims to the
waters of the Truckee River. These claims may affect each state's
equitable share of the waters of Lake Tahoe and the Truckee River.
To a lesser extent, there is also uncertainty over respective rights
to the waters of the Carson and Walker Rivers. In addition, the
cities of Reno and Sparks anticipate shortages of water in the event
of a serious drought, and the search for additional sources of water
has sparked new controversies over interstate ground water basins.
This article presents an overview of these controversies, past and
present. It also considers alternative methods of interstate allocation.
Emphasis is placed on the Truckee River and Lake Tahoe since
their waters have been central to the interstate allocation issue.
Disputes concerning the Truckee River and Lake Tahoe must be
resolved or successfully avoided before an effective interstate allo-
cation can be achieved between California and Nevada.
I. WATER ALLOCATION CONTROVERSIES, PAST AND PRESENT: AN
OVERVIEW
The efforts of California and Nevada to accomplish an interstate
allocation has been entangled in other issues. These include: (a) the
amount of water which should flow to Pyramid Lake, under federal
reserved water rights, or as a result of obligations under the federal
Endangered Species Act, 4 (b) release of water from Lake Tahoe in
winter for hydroelectric generation, (c) Lake Tahoe levels, both
high and low, (d) the amount of water required for the Reno-
Sparks area in the event of a critical drought, (e) the amount of
water needed for efficient operation of the Truckee-Carson Irriga-
tion District, and (f) the amount of water needed for the Stillwater
Wildlife Management Area near Fallon. These issues have been
controversial in the past, and unless they can be resolved, their
persistence may continue to hinder achieving an interstate allocation.
A. Early Interstate Controversies.
The early interstate controversies arose over schemes to modify
Lake Tahoe and divert its waters through tunnels. The first contro-
4. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 81 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1985)).
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versy involved a proposal by Alexis Von Schmidt 5 to divert water
from Lake Tahoe to the City of San Francisco, via a tunnel that
would also carry transcontinental trains .6
In 1870, the California Legislature authorized the Donner Boom
and Logging Company to construct a dam at the mouth of Lake
Tahoe to develop water to float logs and wood to the mills at
Truckee.7 However, Von Schmidt claimed prior rights and, in the
fall of 1870, he completed a crib dam just below the Lake's outlet,
raising the lake above its natural level.8 Von Schmidt's scheme never
got started. 9 Ultimately, control of Von Schmidt's dam passed to
the Donner Boom and Logging Company.
B. The Truckee River Controlled and Diverted: Impacts on Lake
Tahoe and Pyramid Lake
1. The Newlands Project.
The first project authorized under the Reclamation Act of 190210
was named for Nevada's Representative (later Senator) Francis G.
Newlands. The Project, which was approved by the Secretary of
the Interior in 1903, was intended to irrigate 232,000 acres in the
vicinity of Fallon with water from the Carson and Truckee Rivers.
5. Von Schmidt was a civil engineer who also surveyed the California-Nevada boundary
in the area. See California v. Nevada, 447 U.S. 125, 129, 133 (1980) (affirming the Von
Schmidt line).
6. For the early history of the interstate dispute see W. JACKSON AND D. PISANI, A CASH
STUDY IN INTERSTATE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: THE CALIFORNIA-NEVADA VATER CONTROVER-
sy, 1865-1955 1-6 (California Water Resources Center, Contribution No. 142, 1973) [hereinafter
JACKSON].
7. 1870 Cal. Stat. ch. 513, at 771. Interestingly, section 5 of that statute required the
dam to have a fish ladder or the franchise would be forfeited. Apparently, no fish ladder was
included in the original dam.
8. See 30 Op. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 262 (1957) (history and legal implications of regulation
of Lake Tahoe levels).
9. Jackson, supra note 6, at 4-5. Two other California export schemes were proposed.
In 1900, Luther Waggoner, Chief of the San Francisco Department of Public Utilities,
considered a tunnel from Lake Tahoe to the North Fork American River, but dropped the
scheme after surveying the area. Id. In 1908, James A. Waymire proposed a Tahoe aqueduct
into the American River watershed at the Rubicon River to supply water and power. WAYMIRE,
DIVERTING WATER FROM LAKE TAHOE FOR USE IN CALnroRNiA (1908).
10. 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 471-616 (1982 & Supp.
1985)).
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Today, only 63,000 acres are irrigated." In 1926, the United States
contracted with the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District to operate
the Project.
In 1905, the first feature of the Project, Derby Diversion Dam, was
constructed on the Truckee River. The Dam and the Truckee Canal
diverted waters over to the Carson River for the reclamation project.
At the outset, the Project relied on the natural flow of the Carson
River and the Truckee Canal. However, experience indicated that a
storage reservoir was necessary, and in 1915 Lahontan Dam and
Reservoir was constructed to store the combined waters of the
Carson and Truckee Rivers. 12
2. Impact of the Newlands Project on Pyramid Lake.
In 1859, the Secretary of the Interior set aside 322,000 acres of
land surrounding Pyramid Lake and the Lower Truckee River as
an Indian reservation. Pyramid Lake was chosen so that the Indians
could take advantage of the Lake's plentiful fishery and irrigate the
land along the Lower Truckee River. 3
The impact of the Newlands Project's diversion on Pyramid Lake
was devastating. Prior to this development, the entire natural flow
of the Truckee River went to Pyramid Lake. The Lake evaporates
approximately four feet a year (approximately 440,000 acre feet).' 4
After Derby Dam blocked the natural flow of the Truckee River,
Pyramid Lake's level dropped to a point where a delta formed at
the mouth of the Truckee River. By the late 1930s the Pyramid
Lake subspecies of Lahontan Cutthroat trout became extinct. In
the 1940s, the Lake was restocked with Cutthroat Trout. The Cui-
ui barely survived by spawning along the edge of the Lake where
the Truckee River water entered. The Secretary of the Interior listed
11. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT REPORT FOR THE NEwLANDS PROJECT PROPOSED OPERATING CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES,
at S-4 (Dec. 1987) [hereinafter OCAP EIS] (copy on file with the Department of Water
Resources). The EIS states that 57,518 acres have legal Project water rights.
12. See Water and Power Resources Service, Project Data, at 685-90 (1981) (a complete
technical description of the Newlands Project) (copy on file with the Department of Water
Resources).
13. See KNACK AND STEWART, As LONG AS THE RIVER SHALL RUN: AN ETHNOHISTORY OF
THE Pmp nD LAKE INDIAN RESERVATION (Berkeley, 1984) (a detailed history of the Pyramid
Lake Indian Reservaiton).
14. See Harding, Recent Variations in the Water Supply of the Western Great Basin, Water
Resources Center Archives Report No. 16 (1965). The report provides a history of lake
level fluctuations.
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the Cui-Ui as endangered in 196715 and the Lahontan Cutthroat
trout as threatened in 1975.16 The Lake level has recovered in recent
years to a point where fish again swim up to Marble Bluff Dam
after the 1982-1983 wet years.
While Pyramid Lake receded over many years, its problems did
not become a major component of the interstate water disputes
until the 1970s, when the United States and the Tribe asserted
claims to additional water to sustain the Lake's fishery under the
Winters doctrine17 and the Endangered Species Act 8 .
3. Use of Lake Tahoe Water for the Newlands Project and
the Power Company
The major interstate conflicts in the early Twentieth Century
involved proposals to obtain more water from Lake Tahoe for the
Newlands Project. The United States sought control over storage
at Lake Tahoe and regulation of its release into the Truckee, either
by gaining control of the dam or by getting the water out of Lake
Tahoe by other means. The tables had turned; Californians began
to object to water export schemes for Nevada.
By 1908, the Truckee River General Electric Company had pur-
chased the Lake Tahoe Dam. This company was the predecessor of
the Sierra Pacific Power Company. The agreement under which the
dam was purchased established specified Truckee River flows gen-
erally known as the "Floriston Rates."' 19 At the time, they assured
sufficient water for power generation and for irrigation in Nevada.
However, over the years, they have been a source of interstate
controversy, because they contributed both to high water conditions
15. C.F.R. 4001 (1967) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11).
16. C.F.R. 29863 (1975) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11).
17. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, (1908) (water impliedly reserved under federal
law for Indian reservations in amounts necessary to carry out the purposes of the reservations).
The Winters claim for the fish was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Nevada v.
United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983). See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussion
of the Ditch case).
18. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984).
19. The original Floriston Rates required that there be a mean flow of water in the
Truckee River of 500 cubic feet per second from March 1 to September 30 of each year, and
400 cubic feet per second between October 1 and February 28-29, as measured near the
California-Nevada border. If necessary, water must be released from Lake Tahoe to maintain
those rates of flow. See Sierra Pacific Power Company, 1985 - 2005 Water Resource Plan, at
3-1 (October 1985) (a good description of the Floriston Rates, as modified) (copy on file with
the Department of Water Resources) [hereinafter Water Resource Plan]. Preparation of this
plan was ordered by the Public Service Commission of Nevada, Docket No. 84-1006.
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in Lake Tahoe during wet years and low water conditions during
the drought which occured during the 1920s and early 1930s.
In 1911, the Truckee River General Electric Company proposed
to construct a diversion tunnel from Lake Tahoe to Washoe Lake
and return the water to the Truckee River near Reno. This scheme
was supported by the Reclamation Service. The Service argued that
the tunnel was an improvement on the Lake's natural outlet and a
more effective way of using the Lake's "surplus" waters. 20 The
scheme was vehemently opposed by property owners around Lake
Tahoe, and it was ultimately blocked by California. In the Autumn
of 1912, the power company and the Reclamation Service sent a
work crew with dredging equipment to cut down the Lake's rim,
but property owners quickly obtained an injunction from a Placer
County court. 21 The designs of the Reclamation Service and the
Power Company at this time on the waters of Lake Tahoe undoubt-
edly led the California Conservation Commission to include its
recommendation that California seek a U.S. Supreme Court adju-
dication.'-
In 1915, The Reclamation Service obtained the dam from the
power company in a consent decree, United States v. Truckee River
General Electric Co.3 The decree granted the United States control
of the dam and the right to regulate the water level in Lake Tahoe.
The decree also benefitted the power company by recognizing the
Floriston Rates and by committing the United States to release
water to satisfy them.
4. Lake Tahoe High Water, Low Water Disputes
High and low water levels in Lake Tahoe have also been a source
of interstate controversy. Landowners complained about high water
level flooding their littoral lands and causing damage to their
property from winter storms. These complaints have continued to
20. Jackson, supra note 6, at 8-9.
21. Id. at 7-11.
22. See supra note 2.
23. United States v. Truckee River Gen. Elec. Co., Civ. No. S-643-LKK (E.D. Cal. 1915)
(as modified by the Truckee River Agreement and the Prosser Creek Reservoir Agreement)
(on file at the Pacific Law Journal). The State of California was not a party to the consent
decree and never assented to it. The California Attorney General's objections to the decree's
effects on Lake Tahoe led to modifications of the decree in the 1935 Truckee River Agreement,
which established a maximum permissible lake level of 6229.1 feet and lesser winter Floriston
Rates when the Lake is below specified levels.
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the present. Disputes have also involved pumping the Lake when
its low water level fell below the natural rim. These pumping
disputes occurred during the drought in the late 1920s and early
1930s. The pumping issue recurred in 1961 and again during the
1977 drought, when pumping the Lake became a possibility.24
While most high water disputes occurred after the United States
acquired control of some of the Lake Tahoe dam in 1915, disputes
preceded that date.2 3 The years 1914-1917 were wet years and the
Lake exceeded elevation of 6229.1 feet four times. In response to
complaints from the California Attorney General and property
owners, the Secretary of the Interior promised in 1919 to ask the
United States Attorney General to bring legal actions to determine
the United States' authority to operate the dam and to condemn
whatever littoral interests were taken as the result of such operation.
No condemnation action was ever instituted.26
The period between 1919 to 1934 was unusually dry. During this
period, the low water level of the Lake dropped below the rim in
1924, and each year from 1929 to 1936.27 When this occurred, no
water could flow naturally into the Truckee River. A major legal
concern was whether artificially lowering the level of the Lake,
either through pumping or cutting the rim, might sever the riparian
rights of the littoral owners. The California Attorney General
repeatedly opposed proposals of the Reclamation Service to lower
the rim.28
In 1924 and 1929, the State of California and the littoral owners
permitted pumping of the Lake when it fell below the rim. 21 In
24. Pumping negotiations between the two states occurred in August 1961. California
demanded that Nevada assume responsibility for any damage to property owners in California
and indemnify the State of California from liability to individual property owners as a result
of giving its consent to pumping. See Letter from R.C. Price, Chairman, California Committee
on Pumping from Lake Tahoe to W.W. White, Chairman, Nevada Committee on Pumping
from Lake Tahoe (January 9, 1962) (copy on file with the Department of Water Resources).
Pumping was again briefly considered in 1977, but no negotiations took place.
25. The highest water level of record - 6231 feet - occurred in 1907. In 1912, the State
of California brought suit against the Truckee River General Electric Company seeking removal
of the dam on the ground that raising and lowering the level of the Lake was an irreparable
injury and without right as against the State. The suit never came to trial and was dismissed
without prejudice in 1939. California v. Truckee River Gen. Elec. Co., Equity No. 304 (N.
D. Cal. 1939). See 30 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. at 265.
26. 30 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. at 265.
27. The low water level also dropped below the rim in 1961-62 and 1977-78.
28. Jackson, supra note 6, at 12.
29. Water has been pumped from the Lake in four years. In 1924, pumping of 34,000
acre-feet occurred from August 2 to November 7; in 1929, 33,960 a.f., Aug. 6 - Dec. 11; in
1930, 25080 a.f., Aug. 21 - Nov. 16; In 1934, 24,610 a.f., Jul. 12 - Nov. 10. Preliminary
1346
1988 / The Past, Present and Future
July, 1930, when the Lake again dropped below the rim, the littoral
owners denied another pumping request. Nevadans sent a steam
shovel and crew under police guard to Lake Tahoe in late July to
dig a diversion trench at the rim. 30 The work crew was met by
angry Tahoe residents. On July 29, a temporary restraining order
preventing the excavation was obtained from the El Dorado County
Superior court. Ultimately, this confrontation led to negotiations
resulting a 1930 pumping agreement. 3'
In May, 1931, Nevada Governor Fred Balzar wrote to California
Governor James Rolph, Jr. asking that an interstate committee be
established to help resolve the pumping disputes. Governor Rolph
agreed. Thus in June, 1931, the Lake Tahoe Interstate Water
Conference Committee came into existence, consisting of three
members from each State. While it had no statutory basis and was
advisory only, the Committee facilitated negotiations of pumping
agreements. With the return of wet years in the late 1930s and
1940s, the Committee served as a forum for high water disputes.
The Committee also assisted in fixing the maximum and minimum
levels of Lake Tahoe and saw them included in the 1935 Truckee
River Agreement. 32
5. The Truckee River Agreement.
In response to the drought in the 1930s, the Bureau of Recla-
mation developed plans for a dam and reservoir on the Little
Truckee River at Boca to serve the irrigators in the Reno area,
whose early rights were to natural flow only. To construct such a
reservoir, an operating agreement was negotiated among the major
water rights holders of the Truckee River.33 The agreement requires
operation of Lake Tahoe, and the then proposed Boca Reservoir,
to maintain the Floriston Rates. The Floriston rates were modified
so that rate of releases in the winter depends on levels in Lake
Report of the Lake Tahoe Interstate Water Conference Committee (issued as a Public Service
for the Information of Interested Tahoe Property Owners in the States of California and
Nevada) (Aug. 4, 1952)) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
30. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 20.
31. Id. at 21-22.
32. Id. at 22-30.
33. See Truckee River Agreement (June 13, 1935) (copy on file at the Pacific Law
Journal).
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Tahoe. 34 The Agreement recognizes the 1926 contract, which as-
signed operation of the Lake Tahoe Dam from the United States
to the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID). 5 Maximum stor-
age in Lake Tahoe cannot exceed 6229.1 feet, and water must be
released insofar as practicable to prevent the Lake from exceeding
that elevation. 36 Modications to the rim of the Lake or artifical
outlets were prohibited without the consent of the California At-
torney General. Pumping the Lake for sanitary and domestic pur-
poses requires the public health officials of both States to file a
certificate of necessity with the Attorney General of their respective
states.17 These provisions were added at the insistence of the Cali-
fornia Attorney General, U.S. Webb. However, the States of Cal-
ifornia and Nevada are not parties to the Agreement.
The Truckee River Agreement was a major milestone in the
adjudication which the United States had filed in 1913 to establish
water rights for the Newlands Project and the Pyramid Lake Res-
ervation-the Orr Ditch litigation.
C. The Orr Ditch Decree: Certainty Revisited.
1. The Orr Ditch Litigation.
While construction began on the Newlands Project in 1905, it did
not come into full operation until after 1915. In the interval, a
number of appropriations of water under Nevada law were initiated
upstream. In addition, many people believed that the Pyramid Lake
Indian Reservation had unquantified reserved water rights by virtue
of the Winters Decision.38 Therefore, in March, 1913, the United
States initiated an adjudication of the water rights of the Truckee
River to quantify the amount of water available for the Newlands
34. Id. at articles I (B), I (K), and III. The original rates, 500 cubic feet per second in
the summer and 400 cubic feet in the winter, apply when the Lake is at or above 6226 feet.
Between 6225.25 feet and 6226, the winter rates (Nov. 1 - Mar. 31) are 350 cubic feet per
second. When the Lake is below 6225.25 feet, the flows are 300 cubic feet per second in
winter.
35. rd. at article XVI.
36. Id. at article III (F).
37. Id. at article XXV (0).
38. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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Project and the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation.3 9 The complaint
named as defendants all water users on the Truckee River in
Nevada. 40
In 1924, the special master issued a report and proposed decree.
The proposed decree awarded the Reservation an 1859 priority to
a flow of 58.7 c.f.s. and 12,412 acre-feet of water annually to
irrigate 3,130 acres. For the Newlands Project, the Reclamation
Service was awarded a 1902 priority for 1,500 c.f.s. for the irrigation
of up to 232,800 acres. 41 The Court accepted the Special Master's
recommendation and issued a temporary restraining order to estab-
lish a trial period for the parties' water rights.
The 1929-1935 drought renewed interest in concluding the Orr
Ditch litigation. Settlement negotiations began in 1934 and culmi-
nated in the 1935 Truckee River Agreement.
In the early phases of the Orr Ditch litigation, the United States
represented the interests of both the Newlands Project and the
Pyramid Lake Tribe. In the 1934-35 negotiations, the Newlands
project was represented by the TCID. 42 In 1944, following comple-
tion of Boca reservoir, a final decree was entered which incorporated
the Truckee River Agreement by reference.
2. The Decree Reconsidered: Nevada v. United States.
Shortly after the California-Nevada Interstate Compact was
adopted, the United States sought leave to file a bill of complaint
in the United States Supreme Court against Nevada and California
seeking a declaration of their respective rights to the waters of the
Truckee River. 43 The purpose of this action was to perfect a prior
39. United States v. Orr Ditch Water Company, Equity No. A-3 (D. Nev. 1944). The
decree is sometimes referred to as the "Truckee River Decree." See United States v. Truckee-
Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286, 1290-96 (9th Cir. 1981) rev'd, Nevada v. United States,
468 U.S. 110 (1983) (the most detailed description of this litigation). See also Comment, The
Continuing Saga of Pyramid Lake: Nevada v. United States, 24 NAT. RnsouRcs J. 1067
(1984).
40. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir. 1981).
The Orr Ditch litigation and decree included only Nevada parties. However it quantifies certain
water rights within California claimed by the Nevada parties, including the Lake Tahoe and
Boca Reservoir storage and the power company's diversion rights for power generation.
41. Id. at 1292.
42. Id. at 1294.
43. United States v. Nevada and California, 412 U.S. 534 (1973). The suit was filed after
the states had ratified the California-Nevada Interstate Compact, which the United States
opposed as interfering with federal claims and powers.
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water right to maintain the level of Pyramid Lake and its fishery.
The Supreme Court denied the motion because, with the Compact
pending before Congress, there was no controversy between the two
states concerning the Truckee River. The Court noted that even
though it had original jurisdiction, the jurisdiction was not exclusive.
In December 1973, after the Supreme Court denied the original
jurisdiction motion, the United States filed an action in the United
States District Court for Nevada against the TCID, the State of
Nevada, other parties to the Orr Ditch decree, and other persons
claiming Truckee River water rights in Nevada. The complaint
alleged that the Orr Ditch decree only quantified the Reservation's
reserved right to irrigation water. The decree did not quantify the
right to sufficient flows to preserve Pyramid Lake and to maintain
the lower Truckee River as a spawning habitat for the Lake's fish.44
The Pyramid Lake Tribe intervened in support of the United States.
All the defendants raised the affirmative defense of res judicata,
claiming that the Orr Ditch decree barred the United States or the
Tribe from claiming additional reserved water rights for Pyramid
Lake.
The District Court held that the Orr Ditch decree was res judicata.
It dismissed the United States and the Tribe's claims with preju-
dice. 45 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part but
reversed the dismissal as to the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District.
The decree was not res judicata for the Tribe and the Newlands
Project because they had been represented by the United States
attorneys in the Orr Ditch litigation, and their interests were not
sufficiently adverse to one another to warrant the use of res judi-
cata. 46
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
doctrine of res judicata barred the United States and the Tribe from
litigating the reserved right claim against all defendants. 47 Writing
for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument
that the United States breached its duty to the Tribe when it
represented both the Reservation and the project. While the United
44. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1983). The complaint also sought
water for the Stillwater wildlife Refuge near Fallon, the Toiyabe National Forest, and for
other purposes. See Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d at 1295.
45. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., Civ. No. R-1897-JBA (D. Nev.
1977). See Note, The Continuing Saga of Pyramid Lake, Nevada v. United States, 24 NAT.
REsouRcEs J. 1063, 1071 (1984).
46. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d at 1290-94.
47. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
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States has a distinctive obligation in its dealings with Indian Tribes,
Congress also imposed substantial obligations with respect to rec-
lamation projects.
It may well appear that Congress was requiring the Secretary of
the Interior to carry water on both shoulders .... But Congress
chose to do this, and it is simply unrealistic to suggest that the
Government may not perform its obligation to represent Indian
tribes in litigation when Congress has obligated it to represent
other interests as well. 48
Both the United States and the Tribe were bound by the Orr
Ditch decree. The Orr Ditch defendants could assert the decree
against the Government and the Tribe.49 In addition, persons who
were not parties to Orr Ditch may assert res judicata against the
United States and the Tribe, if they relied on the decree in initiating
their use of water. The Court recognized an exception from the
general rule of mutuality of estoppel for general stream adjudica-
tions.50
As we have already explained, everyone involved in Orr Ditch
contemplated a comprehensive adjudication of water rights in-
tended to settle once and for all the question of how much of the
Truckee River each of the litigants was entitled to. Thus, even
though quiet title actions are in personam actions, water adjudi-
cations are more in the nature of in rem proceedings. Nonparties
such as the subsequent appropriators in these cases have relied
just as much on the Orr Ditch decree in participating in the
development of western Nevada as have the parties to that case.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that under 'these circum-
stances it would be manifestly unjust.., not to permit subsequent
appropriators' to hold the Reservation to the claims it made in
Orr Ditch; '[a]ny other conclusion would make it impossible ever
finally to quantify a reserved right' .... 1
Nevada v. United States ended most of the uncertainty over
reserved rights claims for Pyramid Lake, for persons who can show
that they relied on the decree. However, some uncertainty remains
as to the amount of unappropriated water available in both States.
48. 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983).
49. Id. at 140.
50. The res judicata doctrine bars a party and his privy from relitigating causes which
were previously adjudicated or which could have been adjudicated in a prior proceeding. Under
the traditional rule of mutuality of estoppel, the res judicata doctrine could not be asserted
by one who was not a party to the original proceedings.
51. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 143-44 (1983).
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On remand to the District Court, the Tribe sought leave to amend
its original complaint to assert a reserved water right to all unap-
propriated water in the Truckee River. The District Court held in
1985 that undue delay in seeking to amend the complaint and
prejudice to parties claiming rights to the water barred the new
claim.12
3. The OCAP Litigation.
Most litigation affecting the Truckee River has direct interstate
impacts or has involved California in some way. Up to now, the
litigation over operating criteria and procedures (OCAP) for the
TCID has involved only Nevada parties. It concerns the efficiency
of the TCID's operations. It affects California to the extent that
the Truckee and Carson Rivers are very limited resources with
competing demands exceeding their supplies. The OCAP dispute is
a part of increasingly competitive demands on the system, which
could potentially affect all users.
Since 1967, the Secretary of the Interior has adopted annual
regulations setting operating criteria and procedures for the New-
lands project. Their purpose is to maximize use of Carson River
water and minimize diversions from the Truckee River. The Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe brought suit challenging these regulations. It
alleged that the OCAP regulations delivered more water than the
Newlands Project was entitled to under applicable decrees.
In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton,53 Judge
Gesell held that waste was occurring in the Newlands Project and
the Secretary's fiduciary obligations to the Tribe require delivery of
all water to Pyramid Lake not otherwise obligated by court decrees
or contracts. The court established a more rigorous OCAP than the
Secretary had proposed.5 4 The OCAP also required the Secretary to
terminate the 1926 contract with TCID if it substantially violated
the regulations. In 1973, the TCID deliberately diverted more water
than allowed under the OCAP, and the Secretary proposed to
52. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 107 F.R.D. 377 (1985).
53. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D. D.C. 1973).
54. Id. at 260-66. These regulations established an OCAP for the Newlands Project,
designed to promote efficiency and limit the amount of water the Truckee-Carson Irrigation
District can divert from the Truckee River to 350,000 acre feet of water during the first year
they went into effect.
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terminate the contract. The United States District Court in Nevada
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed the authority of
the Secretary to terminate the contract. 55
Since the Morton decision, the Bureau of Reclamation has issued
an "interim" OCAP each year, and it has often been the subject
of litigation. The Bureau has proposed a final OCAP with a
maximum annual Truckee River diversion of 338,000 acre feet for
1988 and with a gradual annual reduction to 320,000 acre feet by
1992. This would be an ultimate reduction of approximately 40-
50,000 acre feet per year from past operations.5 6 The proposed Final
OCAP has been challenged by all interests. The issues in dispute
are numerous. They include: the number of acres eligible to receive
Project water, 57 duties of water on Project lands, compliance with
past OCAP's, water requirements for the Stillwater Wildlife Man-
agement area, operation of Lahontan Reservoir to store Carson
River flows, versus maintaining a high recreation pool, and ade-
quacy of the draft and final OCAP EIS. Further litigation over the
OCAP appears certain.
4. Paiutes v. California
On June 23, 1981, while the appeal in United States v. Truckee
Carson Irrigation District was pending before the Ninth Circuit, the
Tribe filed a separate class action against the State of California
and seventeen water districts and companies holding California
water rights. The Tribe sought a reserved water right with an 1859
priority to water for Pyramid Lake and its fishery. 8 The case is
essentially a California counterpart to the Nevada action.
The California defendants asserted res judicata as an affirmative
defense alleging that the Tribe's rights were adjudicated in the Orr
Ditch decree. After Nevada v. United States was decided, California
moved for summary judgment on the basis that the State and other
55. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. Secretary Dep't of Interior, 742 F.2d 527 (9th Cir.
1984).
56. The controversial nature of the OCAP is illustrated by 331 pages of comments on
the draft EIS and responses. See OCAP EIS, supra note 11.
57. Recently, the District Court in Nevada rejected the Tribe's effort to prevent irrigation
of farm acreage within the Fallon Navy Base. The land is leased and irrigated for dust control.
See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Department of the Navy, CV-R-86-115-BRT (D.
Nev. 1987) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
58. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. State of California, No. Civ S-81-378 RAR
(D. Cal. filed 1981) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
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California water users could assert res judicata in the same manner
as Nevada users. Moreover, the State of California argued that it
had relied on the Orr Ditch decree in administering its water rights
system. The Tribe argued that only Nevada defendants could rely
on Orr Ditch.
The District Court granted summary judgment for those parties
holding California appropriative water rights who could establish
reliance on the Orr Ditch decree. It denied summary judgment
without prejudice for riparian water rights, finding that reliance
had not been established. 9 The court also held that the State of
California could not assert res judicata. Although the state took
the Orr Ditch decree into account in determining the amount of
water available for appropriation, the court found that the state
had not changed its position with regard to unappropriated waters
in reliance on the decree. The case was stayed pending resolution
of the similar case in Nevada.60 The litigation is currently on hold
while possible settlements of all Truckee River litigation are pursued.
Had the California-Nevada Interstate .Compact been in effect, the
outcome of the Paiutes case may have been different. The State of
California argued that there was no justiciable case or controversy
with the Tribe. This was because California and Nevada were
voluntarily complying with the proposed Compact for allocation of
Truckee River water. Under the Compact, Nevada agreed to satisfy
any valid Reservation rights out of Nevada's share of water. 6' The
court rejected this argument finding that the Compact is only a
"private agreement" since Congress has not yet approved it.
The Paiutes case illustrates the uncertainty that results from the
lack of an equitable apportionment. The two states negotiated the
Compact to assure that California, the upstream state, would have
a certain amount of water for present and future needs. The
Compact gave Nevada, the downstream state, certainty that Cali-
fornia water users would not encroach on its supply beyond that
allocated to California. Among other purposes, the Compact was
intended to prevent individuals from one state interfering with water
right administration in the other. From California's perspective, the
heart of the Compact was the provision that federal uses of water
would be charged to the state where the use occurs.
59. Id. (order partially granting and denying summary judgment, March 29, 1985).
60. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., Civ. No. R-2987-RCB (D. Nev.
1973).
61. See Interstate Compact supra note 2 at article III C.
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D. The Washoe Project Act, Stampede Reservoir, and Truckee
River Fish Flows.
1. Interstate Disputes over the Proposed Washoe Project
During the 1940s and early 1950s, the Bureau of Reclamation
investigated several potential water supply development projects on
the Truckee and Carson Rivers. These investigations culminated in
a 1954 feasibility report proposing authorization of the Washoe
Project. 62 The proposed project included a 126,000 acre foot res-
ervoir on the Little Truckee River upstream from Boca Reservoir,
and a reservoir on the Carson River, which would straddle the
boundary between the states. All additional land opened to irrigation
by the project would have been in Nevada. The Washoe Project
plans were opposed by the State of California and California water
users. The proposed project was perceived as a threat to future
water uses within California.6 3 When legislation authorizing the
Washoe Project was introduced in Congress in 1955, California
officials sought to amend it to protect California water interests.
In hearings held in 1955 before the House Interior and Insular
Affairs Committee, Harvey 0. Banks, the California State Engineer,
recommended that the Stampede Reservoir authorization be amended
to allow for future expansion of the reservoir to meet future needs
in California.6 California's opposition to the Washoe Project leg-
islation threatened to kill the Project and to bar any chance of
negotiating an interstate water compact. Thus, the newly created
interstate compact commissions of each state negotiated amendments
addressing California's concerns. These amendments were subse-
quently incorporated into the Washoe Project Act. 65
The California amendments provided that Stampede Reservoir be
designed to allow future enlargement to 175,000 acre-feet for irri-
62. See H.R. Doc. No. 181, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
63. Events leading to the Washoe project Act and negotiation of the California-Nevada
Interstate Compact are set forth in more detail. See W. Jackson and D. Pisani, A Case Study
in Interstate Resource Management: the California-Nevada Water Controversy, 1955-1958,
(California Water Resources Center Contribution No. 147, 1974) [hereinafter Jackson & Pisani].
64. H.R. Doc. No. 181, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. at 200 (1955).
65. Washoe Project Act, Pub. L. No. 84-858, 70 Stat. 775 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 614a
(1956)).
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gation of up to 12,000 acres in California. 6 The United States was
prohibited from developing power on the Little Truckee River in a
way that would impair future appropriation of water for consump-
tive use in California. 67 Finally, California water users in Alpine
County were given the first opportunity to contract for yield from
the proposed Watasheamu Reservoir on the Carson River before
any water was offered for the development of new land in Nevada.68
In 1966, the California Department of Water Resources was au-
thorized to contract for yield from the Washoe project upon request
of local agencies.6 9
2. Fishery Versus Urban Use of Stampede Storage: The
Carson-Truckee Cases
When Stampede was completed in 1970, the Bureau of Recla-
mation proposed use of its water for domestic, municipal, and
industrial purposes. However, the Secretary of the Interior has
approved use of the reservoir's yield only for the Pyramid Lake
fishery.
In 1958, the Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy District was
created under Nevada law to enter into repayment contracts to
purchase water from Stampede Reservoir .0 The Bureau initially
recommended execution of the contract, but no Secretary of the
Interior has approved it. In 1967, the Secretary listed the Pyramid
Lake Cui-ui as endangered. 71 In 1969, the Secretary notified the
Carson-Truckee District that he no longer intended to operate
Stampede for municipal and industrial purposes, and, until. legal
rights to the water were settled, he would operate Stampede only
66. Id. at 775-77. The State Water Rights Board issued Water Right Permits Nos. 11604
and 11605 pursuant to Decision No. 913 for Stampede Reservoir on October 27, 1956. It
reserved to California water users the right to appropriate water not to exceed 30,000 acre-
feet annually of the unappropriated water of the Truckee River system for use in the Truckee
River Basin, limited annually to 30/156ths of the unappropriated water at the Stampede Dam
site. The permit also included a condition requiring operation of the Stampede Reservoir to
conform to any interstate compact covering distribution and use of the waters of the Truckee
and Carson Rivers, if and when one is approved by the two states and Congress. The Bureau
of Reclamation increased the design capacity of Stampede Reservoir to 226,500 acre-feet before
it was constructed.
67. Id. § 2(e), 70 Stat. 775, 776.
68. Id. § 2(d), 70 Stat. 775, 776.
69. CAL. WATE CODE §§ 12050-57 (West 1971).
70. Water conservancy districts are established by court proceedings. See Chapter 541,
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 541.010-541.420 (Michie 1986 & 1987 Supp.).
71. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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for "flood control, recreation, and fish and wildlife benefits." '72
The District and the Sierra Pacific Power Company brought a
declaratory judgment action against the Secretary of the Interior.
They contended that the Washoe Project Act obligated the Secretary
to store water in Stampede for the benefit of the plaintiffs. 73 The
Pyramid Lake Tribe intervened as a defendant. All parties agreed
that the Secretary had obligations to the Tribe and under the
Endangered Species Act. These obligations took precedence over
the Secretary's responsbility to store water for municipal and in-
dustrial purposes. 74 The issue before the court was the degree to
which fish should be preferred over the municipal and industrial
uses. The court held that the Secretary had the duty to defer all
other uses until the fish were no longer classified as endangered or
threatened. 75 The court deferred to the Secretary's plan to release
water from Stampede during the May-June spawning season of the
Cui-ui. The court found that releases for the fish may require all
of the storage in Stampede, leaving none for municipal and indus-
trial uses during drought years. 76
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's construction of
the Endangered Species Act. The circuit court found that the act
supported the Secretary's decision to use the yield of Stampede
until the fish are no longer threatened. However, the court did not
rule on whether the Secretary had an obligation to reimburse the
depleted water. 77
The effect of the Carson-Truckee decisions forced Westpac Util-
ities (the subsidiary of Sierra-Pacific) and Washoe County to search
for alternative sources of water for the growing demands for the
Reno-Sparks area. Westpac argued that it cannot rely on irrigation
water alone in a drought. Stored water is needed to satisfy their
needs. 7s
72. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 537 F. Supp. 106, 109 (D. Nev.
1982), aff'd, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984). See id. at 107-10, Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy
Dist. v. Watt, 549 F. Supp. 704, 706-08 (D. Nev. 1982) (background of the events leading up
to the Stampede Reservoir litigation). See also 37 Fed. Reg. 19838 (Sept. 1972) (for the
Secretary's decision to operate Stampede Reservoir for Pyramid Lake fish).
73. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 537 F. Supp. 106, 109 (D. Nev.
1982).
74. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 549 F. Supp. 704, 708 (D. Nev.
1982).
75. Id. at 710.
76. Id. at 711.
77. Carson-Truckee Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 261 (9th Cir. 1984).
78. Water Resource Plan, supra note 20, at 3-14 - 3-16.
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California's rights to stored water in Stampede are speculative as
a result of the Carson-Truckee decisions. The California-Nevada
Interstate Compact would have allocated California up to 6,000
acre-feet per year yield from Stampede for use in the Truckee Basin,
or by exchange. 79 The Compact would not have obligated the
Secretary to contract with California for water from Stampede,
since the allocation was "subject to the execution of a contract or
contracts therefor with the United States of America." ' 80 Thus, even
with the Compact, California, like the Carson-Truckee District, may
have been denied use of Stampede Storage.
The uncertainty over the availability of Stampede storage was
one of the factors that led the Nevada Public Service Commission
to require Westpac to prepare and update a water resource plan.
Westpac's search for alternative sources of supply, some of which
are in California, has rekindled arguments over allocation of inter-
state waters. The Counties of Lassen, Sierra, and Nevada have
intervened in the Public Service Commission Docket protesting the
plan's identification of California sources of water. One of these
proposals would involve pumping on the Nevada side of the Honey
Lake Ground Water Basin. Nevada has agreed to refain from acting
on applications to export water from this Basin while the United
States Geological Survey conducts a study of potential impacts of
pumping on interstate groundwater supplies. Northeastern Califor-
nia local agencies are protesting water right applications, pending
before the Nevada State Engineer, for the Honey Lake Basin and
elsewhere.- At the same time, California faces the prospect of the
Tribe and other Nevada water users which are protesting water right
applications pending before the State Water Resources Control
Board.8" Interstate disputes over water right proceedings led to the
negotiation of the Compact. Prevention of these disputes was one
79. Interstate Compact, supra note 2, at art. VI B (3).
80. Id. California's testimony at Senate hearings on the Compact pointed out that the
Compact did not compel the allocation of 6,000 acre-feet, but that the water could be obtained
only if the Secretary approved a repayment contract. See California-Nevada Interstate Compact:
Hearings on S. 2457 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 97-8, 106 (July 15, 1986) (Statement of David N. Kennedy)
(a bill to grant the consent of Congress to the California-Nevada Interstate Compact) [here-
inafter S. 2457 Hearing].
81. Since 1972, the State Water Resources Control Board has not permitted any new
applications or extended time for completion of use of existing permits for the Truckee and
Lake Tahoe Basins, pending approval of the Compact. See State Water Resources Control
Board, Report on Water Use and Water Rights, Lake Tahoe Basin (1979).
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of the major objectives of the Compact. However, the Compact
has not been ratified by Congress.
3. The Tahoe Dam Litigation: Floriston Rates Reconsidered?
The Carson-Truckee decisions may have progeny. In September,
1987, the Tribe filed suit against the Secretary of the Interior and
Bureau of reclamation seeking to enjoin repair of the dam at Lake
Tahoe for alleged violations of NEPA and the Endangered Species
Act. 2
On September 28, Judge Karlton denied the Tribe's request for
a preliminary injunction. However, he allowed the Tribe to amend
its complaint to address consistency of current operation of the
Lake Tahoe dam with the requirements of NEPA and the Endan-
gered Species Act. In December, 1987, the Tribe filed an amended
complaint. In addition to the federal violations, the complaint
alleged violation of California's public trust doctrine and California
Constitution Article X, section 2, which requires that diversion and
uses of water be reasonable.
In March, the California Attorney General petitioned to intervene
in the litigation, representing California's interests as parens patriae.
Some California water agencies have also intervened. Other inter-
veners include the State of Nevada, the Sierra Pacific Power Com-
pany, the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, and the Sierra Club.
This litigation raises again the issue of whether the Orr Ditch
decree fixes the rights of the respective parties because the Truckee
River Agreement is incorporated by reference in the decree. If this
hurdle is overcome, the case may develop into a reconsideration of
the Floriston rates, particularly the winter rates.83
II. Tim CALIFORNIA-NEVADA INTERSTATE COMPACT: CERTAINTY
LOST
82. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, No. S-87-1281-LKK/JFM (E.D. Cal.
1987).
83. In various Truckee River negotiations, the Tribe has sought a modification of the
operation of the Truckee River to limit winter releases to amounts needed for consumptive
use; the water otherwise released during the winter for hydroelectric generation would be
released instead in May and June, when it is needed for Lahontan Cutthroat Trout and Cui-
ui spawning.
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A. Disputes Directly Contributing to Compact Negotiations.
Protests of water right proceedings in one state by water users in
the other are not new. The current interstate disputes over pending
water right applications reflect similar disputes in the 1940s and
1950s.
Following the Second World War, Lake Tahoe experienced a new
era of growth. Downstream Nevada water users protested water
right applications made to the California State Engineer4 and the
Nevada State Engineer for domestic and municipal uses in the Lake
Tahoe Basin. The two state engineers issued a joint report in 1949
which concluded that the granting of the pending applications, or
those that would be filed in the foreseeable future, would have
negligible impacts on the depletion of Lake Tahoe waters. The
report recommended that it should be the policy of both states to
continue to grant permits for applications for domestic and recre-
ational uses of water in the Lake Tahoe Basin.85
The Joint Report failed to end continuing protests by downstream
interests to Lake Tahoe water right applications. The Nevada State
Engineer, Edmund Muth, and the California State Engineer, A.D.
Edmonston, believed that an interstate compact was the best way
of achieving certainty over the amount of water available for present
and future uses in the Lake Tahoe Basin. It was their efforts,
together with California's initial opposition to the Washoe Project,
that directly led to negotiation of the California-Nevada Interstate
Compact.
Several additional controversies contributed to the decision to
negotiate an interstate compact. Continuing controversy over high
and low water levels in Lake Tahoe was another issue proposed for
resolution through an interstate compact. High water in 1942 and
1943 and low water in 1949-50 brought demands from Lake Tahoe
residents for limits on Lake Tahoe levels.
In the late 1940s, the United States brought suit against the Sierra
Valley Water Company, which diverts water from the Little Truckee
River to the Sierra Valley. The United States sought a prior right
for the Pyramid Lake Reservation and the Newlands Project. The
84. The State Engineer was the predecessor of the State Water Resources Control Board.
85. Nevada and California State Engineers, Joint Report on the Use of Water in the Lake
Tahoe Watershed (1949) (copy on file with the Department of Water Resources).
1360
1988 / The Past, Present and Future
suit was not settled until after Compact negotiations were under
way.
86
In the Carson River Basin, a general adjudication had been
pending since 1925, when the United States brought suit to establish
the rights of the Newlands Project. The suit, United States v. Alpine
Land and Reservior Co., sought to reconcile all claims in California
and Nevada.87 Similarly, in the Walker River Basin, a 1937 general
adjudication of United States v. Walker River Irrigation District88
established the respective rights of California and Nevada users.
However, these rights were enforced in the 1950s in a new manner
detrimental to California irrigators.
B. Negotiation of the Compact.
In 1955, California89 and Nevada" enacted similar statutes cre-
ating separate compact commissions with the same name, the "Cal-
ifornia-Nevada Interstate Compact Commission." (When the two
Commissions met, they were referred to collectively as the "Joint
California-Nevada Interstate Compact Commission.") Both states
appointed the commissions in 1955. That same year, the United
States Congress gave its consent to the two states to "negotiate and
enter into a compact with respect to the distribution and use of the
waters of the Truckee, Carson, and Walker Rivers, Lake Tahoe,
and tributaries of such rivers and lake in such States." 91 This consent
was given on two conditions: (1) a federal representative appointed
86. United States v. Sierra Valley Water Co., Civ. No. 5597 (N.D. Cal. 1958). The decree
confirms the Company's right to divert up to 60 c.f.s. from the Little Truckee River, with a
maximum flow set for Cold Stream Creek, into which the Truckee waters are diverted. Thus,
the amount that can be diverted under the Sierra Valley right depends on whether the water
year is wet or dry.
87. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., Civ. No. D-183 BRT (D. Nev. Dec.
18, 1980) (final decree) affd, 697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
88. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., No. C-125, (D. Nev. 1937) aff'd, 104
F.2d 334 (1939).
89. 1955 Cal. Stat., ch. 1810.
90. 1955 Nev. Acts, at 225 (codified as amended at NEv. Rav. STAT. AM. §§ 538.270-
538.410 (Michie, 1986)).
91. Pub. L. No. 84-553, 69 Stat. 675 (1955). Advance consent of Congress to negotiate
an interstate compact is not required by United States Constitution, article I, section 10, clause
3. Congress may give its consent before or after negotiation and execution of an interstate
compact. However, advance consent to negotiation of an interstate water compact, with the
requirement that the compact not become effective until later approved by Congress, is the
accepted practice. See Mtrys, INTERSTATE WvATER COMPACTS: THE INTERSTATE COMPACT AND
FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACT 255-59 (1971).
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by the President would participate in the negotiations, and (2) the
Compact would not be binding on the states until ratified by the
Legislature of each State and consented to by the Congress.
President Eisenhower appointed Robert J. Newell as the federal
representative. 92 Newell served as the nonvoting chairman of the
Joint Commission. The federal statute consenting to the compact
negotiations called on the federal representative to "participate in
such negotiations and ... make a report to the President and to the
Congress of such proceedings . . . -91 However, Newell's role and
that of his federal legal advisor, Howard Stinson, was essentially
passive. Newell did not assert federal claims or actively represent
any federal interests during the negotiations. 94 A letter from the
Secretary of the Interior to the members of both State Commissions
advised that the negotiations should stay within the water right
decrees on the Truckee River, including those in the Orr Ditch
decree for Pyramid Lake. 95 Representatives from various federal
agencies attended most Joint Commission meetings, as well as
meetings of the committees which negotiated the allocations for
each drainage basin. These representatives said little about federal
claims or interests.
The United States was under no obligation to participate actively
in the negotiations. Indeed, its historic posture was that it would
not be a party to any interstate compact. As Muys has observed,
where the United States participates in interstate water compact
negotiations as a neutral, nonvoting chairman, its role "is in reality
little more than an honored guest, an observer without obligation
to see that federal plans for programs in the region do not clash
with those of the states." 96 Nonetheless, the posture taken by the
federal officials did nothing to signal the substantial opposition of
92. Newell served through most of the negotiations until 1967. He was replaced by J.R.
Ritter, from the Bureau of Reclamation in Denver. Ritter served until 1971. There was no
federal representative until President Carter appointed John R. Little, Regional Solicitor,
Denver, in 1979.
93. Pub. L. No. 84-553, 69 Stat. 675 (1955).
94. An undated memorandum from Stinson to Newell, apparently written early in 1957,
describes the United States water rights for the reclamation project and the Indian reservations
only in general terms. With respect to the Pyramid Lake reservation, the opinion assumes that
the Tribe has a decreed right to 120 cubic feet per second with an 1859 priority. The opinion
concludes that the United States may consent to be bound by limitations in the compact, if
provided in the consent legislation (copy on file with the Department of Water Resources).
95. Minutes of the Joint Commission Meeting, December 21, 1956 (copy on file with the
Department of Water Resources).
96. Mu s, supra note 91, at 106.
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the United States which would appear in 1965, after a draft of the
Compact was substantially completed. Whether or not justified, the
Compact negotiations appear to have relied on the general guidelines
provided initially by the Secretary of the Interior and on the general
silence of the federal representatives during the negotiations.
The negotiations began in 1956 and dragged on for nine years,
until an agreement was reached on a draft Compact late in 1965.97
The Lake Tahoe, Truckee and Walker river allocations proved
difficult to negotiate because of a series of complex technical matters
that had to be decided. In the Lake Tahoe Basin, a gross diversion
figure of 34,000 acre-feet for present and future uses was agreed
to. This reflects the relative water needs of the area, based on
percentage of land in each State: 11,000 acre-feet per year for
Nevada and 23,000 acre-feet for California. 98 The Truckee Basin
was one of the most difficult agreements. After many deadlocks,
many of the technical details of the ultimate California Truckee
River allocation were left to the permanent Commission established
to administer the Compact. 99 No basin allocations were made within
Nevada, other than the Pyramid Lake Tribe's Orr Ditch decreed
rights. °0 California's allocation had a priority second only to the
Tribe's rights.
There was little disagreement among the Commission members
of both States on the principle that federal uses of water should be
charged to the state where the uses occur. The 1965 draft and the
final version of the Compact contained a provision similar to several
other western interstate water compacts: "The use of water by the
United States of America or any of its agencies, instrumentalities
or wards shall be charged as a use by the state in which the use is
made."'' 1 The Compact also provided that it would not be binding
97. See Jackson & Pisani, supra note 63 (detailed history of the progress of the negotia-
tions, including the initial positions of each State, and the progress toward the ultimate
compromises).
98. See Interstate Compact, supra note 2, at art. V.
99. E.g., Interstate Compact, supra note 2, at art. VI, B (depletion of the Stampede
Reservoir allocation, and development of additional storage in the Truckee River Basin). The
Compact allocated to California 10,000 acre feet per year direct diversion from the Truckee
River, 6,000 acre feet per year from the yield of Stampede Reservoir, and a right to develop
an additional yield of 10,000 acre feet per year in the Truckee Basin when the first two
allocations are used.
100. Interstate Compact, supra note 2, at art. VI. A. and D.
101. Id. at article III C. Compare id. with the Pecos River Compact, Pub. L. 81-91, 63
Stat. 160 (1949) (between Texas and New Mexico). The Pecos River Compact provides:
The consumptive use of water by the United States or any of its agencies, instru-
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on either state unless the Congress provided in its consent legislation,
or by separate legislation, that the allocations between the states
shall be binding on the United States, its agencies, instrumentalities,
and wards. 02
The Commission members of both States felt that these provisions
were vital for two reasons. First, the United States controlled
virtually all the storage on the Truckee River and was its major
water user. Second, the United States claimed substantial portions
of the flow of the Carson and Walker Rivers. However, these two
provisions ultimately proved fatal to the Compact.
C. Objections of the United States to the Compact
In October, 1965, the Joint Commission agreed on a provisional
draft of the Compact, and the federal representative circulated it
to the federal agencies for their formal comments. Given the low
profile of the federal agencies during the negotiations, the formal
comments were a surprise. They ranged from a "no comment" on
behalf of the Department of the Army to substantial objections
from the United States Department of Justice and the United States
Department of the Interior. The main source of objection was the
Compact's requirements in Article XXII that the United States be
bound to the Compact's allocations and Article III C, charging
federal uses to the state where they are made.103 Most of the other
mentalities, or wards shall be charged as a use in the state in which the use is made;
provided that such consumptive use incident to the diversion, impounding, or
conveyance of water in one state for use in the other state shall be charged to the
latter state.
Id. at 165.
See also Republican River Compact, 57 Stat. 86, 90 (1943) (between Colorado, Kansas and
Nebraska) (article XI (a) requires that uses by the United States or "those acting under its
authority" shall be made within the Compact's allocations). President Roosevelt vetoed earlier
consent legislation, because the compact declared the Republican River non-navigable. See
Muys, supra note 91, at 432. A similar provision appears in the Yellowstone River Compact,
Pub. L. No.82-231, 65 Stat. 663, (1951) (between Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming)
(article VII, D.); Belle Fourche River Compact Pub. L. No. 78-236, 58 Stat. 94 (1944) (between
Wyoming and South Dakota).
102. Interstate Compact, supra note 2, at art. XXII.
103. The comments of the federal agencies on the October 1965 provisional draft of the
Compact are summarized in a September 15, 1966, memorandum to Commission members in
the Compact Commission files. The comments are also quoted, with the Commission's response
to each comment in two undated documents titled Comments of the United States Department
of the Interior to the October 1965 Draft of the California-Nevada Interstate Compact and
the Replies Thereto of the California-Nevada Interstate Compact Commission (on file at the
Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter Comments of the Department of Interior], and Comments
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comments were technical in nature. After another two years of
negotiation, these comments either became no longer relevant or
were specifically addressed in the final version of the Compact
approved on July 25, 1968. However, the vexing problem of the
Compact's effect on federal claims remained unresolved.
The Department of Interior comments on the 1965 provisional
draft pointed out that making the allocations binding on federal
agencies was without precedent and recommended that the binding
requirement of Article XXII (3) be deleted. They also recommended
the requirement that federal uses of water be a claim on the entire
interstate stream system and not charged to the allocation of the
state where the uses are made. The Commission's response to the
latter comment was that the proposal "poses problems of great
uncertainty insofar as the rights of the two states are concerned
and could conceivably destroy the theory of the entire Compact." 104
The Department of Justice also questioned the binding effect on
the federal government and suggested that the Commission furnish
a statement of reasons in support of it.
The Commission prepared a long response to the objection to
Article XXII (3), which was signed by the chairmen of both State
commissions. The response pointed out that many of the sections
objected to had been redrafted or deleted.
The few remaining sections to which the two states desire that the
United States be bound are justified basically upon the proposition
that the United States is the major diverter or user of water,
particularly the waters of the Truckee and Carson Rivers and Lake
Tahoe, and that the Compact between the states could not be
effective unless the United States agrees to the total quantity
allocated for use within the respective states.
The Compact area is a water short area with very little surplus
water existing over present use. These present uses are expressed
in the compact in terms of allocations of water to the respective
states. Unless the United States agrees that these allocations are
proper and consents to be bound by them neither state would be
assured by the Compact that these uses could be maintained. It is
of the Department of Justice, Department of Commerce, Federal Water Pollution Control
Administration, Federal Power Commission, to the October 1965 Draft of the California-
Nevada Interstate Compact and the Replied (sic) Thereto of the California-Nevada Interstate
Compact Commission (on file at the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter Comments of the
Department of Justice].
104. Comments of the Department of Interior, supra note 103, at 5.
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almost a certainty that what presently unused waters are available
and could be developed in the future would entail the inclusion
of the United States as a party to the development. These waters
in excess of present use have also been allocated between the
states. If the United States was the developer of a future project,
which seems likely, and if the United States was not bound by the
allocations of water made available by such future development,
the agreement between the two states would be futile. 0t
The two states would make this argument throughout the time
the Compact was pending before Congress. Similar arguments may
be seen in their testimony in congressional hearings on two bills
that would have provided the consent of Congress to the Compact. 06
In 1969, the Secretary of the Interior amplified the Department's
position with regard to the Compact. He wrote that it should be
renegotiated to recognize the United States right to proceed with
litigation to establish the reserved water rights for the Pyramid
Lake Reservation. 0 7 He asserted that:
Our position with regard to the Indian water rights is predicated
upon the principles enunciated in Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564 (1908), and in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
We consider that all waters from Lake Tahoe and the Truckee
River system, other than waters (1) appropriated by the United
States for such other purposes as the Newlands Project, or (2)
adjudicated to third parties in litigation to which the United States
was a party, as in United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., et al.,
Nev. Equity No. A-3, D.C. Nev. September 8, 1944, are reserved
for present and future development of the Pyramid Lake Indian
Reservation.'S0
105. Letter to J.M. Ritter, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation from Hubert Bruns, Chairman,
California Commission and Roland D. Westergard, Chairman, Nevada Commission (Aug. 1,
1968) (copy on file with the Department of Water Resources). See Muys, supra note 91, at
270-273 (text of most of the letter is.reprinted herein).
106. To Settle Claims Affecting the Pyramid Lake Paiute Indian Tribe of Nevada: Hearings
on S. 1558 Before the Senate Select Comm., on Indian Affairs, 99th Cong. 1st. Sess., 171-72(1968) (Statement of Roland D. Westergard) [hereinafter cited as S. 1558 Hearings]. See also
S. 2457 Hearing, supra note 80, at 65-66 (statement of Roland D. Westergard); 90, 95-96
(statement of David N. Kennedy).
107. The United States attempted to bring such an adjudication through its abortive originaljurisdiction suit against Nevada and California. See supra note 43.
108. Letter from Walter Hickel, Secretary of the Interior to Robert P. Mayo, Director,
Bureau of the Budget, (March 18, 1968). A similar letter had been sent from Stewart I. Udall,
Secretary of the Interior, to Charles J. Zwick, Director of the Office of Management and
Budget (January 14, 1969). See S. 1558 Hearings, supra note 106, at 540 (letter from Udall
to Zwick is reprinted herein).
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The effect of this claim, if taken at face value at the time it was
made, would have been that California water users in the Lake
Tahoe and Truckee Basins (except the Sierra Valley Water Co.) had
no entitlements to water, if their uses were initiated after 1859! The
Orr Ditch decree included, for the most part, only Nevada users.
It would be natural to conclude that the United States was playing
a dog-in-the-manger role in the negotiations, since it only made its
strong objections to the reserved rights claim after the Compact
was negotiated. To some degree this conclusion is justified. How-
ever, the thirteen-year period during which the Compact was ne-
gotiated was the twilight of new interstate water compacts and the
dawn of new concerns for the environment and civil rights, including
Indian rights. The United States new position was the result of
environmental concern about the deteriorating conditions at Pyra-
mid Lake. However, it also reflected the expanded scope of reserved
water rights for Indian lands set forth in the Supreme Court's
decision in Arizona v. California.10 9 Arizona and several other
reserved rights cases were decided while the Compact negotiations
dragged on.
D. Ratification of the Compact
In 1969, legislation ratifying the Compact was introduced in the
Nevada and California legislatures. The Nevada legislation was
passed by both houses and signed by Governor Laxalt.Il ° Two bills
were introduced in the California Legislature.' The California bills
were opposed by the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, the United States,
and the Sierra Club. The Assembly Committee on Natural Resources
killed the legislation. Thereafter, Assemblyman Chappie introduced
House Resolution 443 calling for interim study of the Compact.
This resolution was referred to the Assembly Committee on Water.
The Committee submitted a report on the matter in 1970, pro-
posing certain modifications to the Compact.112 The Committee did
109. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). This case utilized the standard of "practicably irrigable acreage"
to quantify an Indian reserved right, although the right was not limited exclusively to irrigation.
Had that standard been used in the Orr Ditch litigation, the Pyramid Lake Reservation claim
may have been based on 19,000 acres, rather than 5,875 acres. See United States v. Truckee-
Carson Irrigation Dist. 649 F.2d 1286, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).
110. Statutes of Nevada, at 69, 1259 (1969) (AB 60).
111. AB 58 (Chappie) and SB 149 (Teale) (1969).
112. Cal. Assem. Comm. on Water, Report on the California-Nevada Interstate Compact,
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not attempt to resolve the objections of the United States, but it
took the United States to task for its role during the Compact
negotiations:
First, we note that the United States was represented by a presi-
dential appointee during the entire thirteen year Compact negoti-
ation period. In view of this, the Committee finds it difficult to
understand why the federal government did not voice its objections
to the Compact until a Compact had been agreed to by the States
of California and Nevada.
We find the United States government's actions to be particularly
unreasonable in view of the necessity of securing approval of a
Compact at the earliest possible time and particularly in view of
the fact that the federal legislation giving consent of Congress to
the States of California and Nevada to negotiate and enter into a
Compact specifically provided that "a representative of the United
States, appointed by the President of the United States shall
participate in such negotiations.... 13
The Committee observed prophetically that "experience has shown
that the federal agencies can be quite successful in delaying con-
gressional consent to a proposed Compact if they have even minor
objections to any of its provisions."11 4 Accordingly, the Committee
recommended that the two states make every effort to resolve the
federal issues prior to forwarding the proposed Compact to Con-
gress.
In 1970, legislation incorporating the Assembly Water Commit-
tee's recommendations was passed and signed by Governor Re-
agan." 5 The Nevada Legislature concurred in the California
amendments to the Compact in 1971, and the bill was signed by
Governor O'Callaghan." 6
In 1972, the California State Water Resources Control Board
adopted a "Policy for the Administration of Water Rights in the
Lake Tahoe Basin." This policy assured that water use on the
at 4-7 (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal). The amendments added Article VI B. 4 (b)
to limit California's right to develop additional yield in the Truckee River Basin to 10,000
acre feet, solely for domestic, municipal, and industrial purposes, and Article XVIII C.,
further clarifying that the Compact would not adversely affect rights to the use of water in
either state.
113. Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 10.
115. 1970 Cal. Stat. ch. 1480 (enacting CAL. WATER CoDE § 5976). The Sierra Club dropped
its opposition to the Compact because of the amendments recommended by the Committee.
It stated that the problem was not the Compact but the Secretary of the Interior's misman-
agement of the Newlands Project.
116. Statutes of Nevada, at 29 (1971).
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California portion of the Basin stayed within the Compact's allo-
cations.
It was intended to be an interim measure until the Compact
became effective. The Policy is still in effect. It provides that
issuance of new water right permits will be limited so that their
aggregate face value, together with all other uses of water, including
ground water, does not exceed 23,000 acre feet per year." 7
The Nevada State Engineer also took steps to assure that water
uses in the Nevada side of the Lake Tahoe Basin remained within
the Compact allocations. However, one case put his authority to
comply voluntarily with the Compact into question. In Morales and
Naify v. Westergard,"8 the Nevada Supreme Court ordered the State
Engineer to issue a permit for a condominium development, part
of which was outside the Lake Tahoe Basin. The use of water
ordered by the Nevada Supreme Court was not permitted by the
Compact. The court avoided determining whether the permits were
a violation of the compact. Instead the court found that most of
the water would be returned by natural gravity to the Lake Tahoe
Basin. The State Engineer responded to the order by making his
approval expressly subject to the Compact and to the United States
v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation District litigation." 9
Voluntary compliance with the erms of the Compact has contin-
ued to the present day. With the exception of the Morales case, no
significant breaches of the Compact allocations have occurred. This
compliance demonstrates that the Compact's allocations are good
evidence of an equitable apportionment, since the states have been
working with the allocations since 1971.
E. Early Efforts to Secure the Approval of Congress.
Governors Laxalt and Reagan agreed with Secretary Hickel to
establish a Pyramid Lake Task Force to investigate possible solu-
117. The Policy is summarized in California State Water Resources Control Board, Report
on Water Use and Water Rights, at 40-41 (October 1979). The S.W.R.C.B. prepared a
controversial environmental impact report on revisions to the Policy, but no final EIR has
been prepared, nor have any revisions been made to the 1972 policy. See Draft Environmental
Impact Report: Policy for Water Allocation in the Lake Tahoe Basin (July 1984) (on file at
the Pacifc Law Journal).
118. 90 Nev. 189, 522 P.2d 1224 (1974).
119. Civ. No. R-2987 JBA (D. Nev. 1973), 649 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, Nevada
v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
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tions to the Pyramid Lake problem. 120 They agreed not to attempt
to secure the consent of Congress while the Task Force was at
work. However, shortly after the California Legislature ratified the
Compact, Representative Harold T. (Bizz) Johnson introduced con-
sent legislation.' 2' When the Task Force determined that the Com-
pact only speaks to the division of waters between the two states
and not to the allocation of waters to other interests within each
state, the Governors decided to push Johnson's bill. While the two
states supported the Johnson bill, no hearings were held on it. The
opposition of the Tribe and the Departments of Interior and Justice
was effective; six consent bills were introduced between 1971 and
1979, and none received a single committee hearing.'2
Throughout this period, the United States continued to oppose
ratification of the Compact. For example, during the Carter Ad-
ministration, Interior Secretary Cecil D. Andrus recommended that
the United States continue to oppose the Compact. Instead, he
proposed negotiation of a new Compact, modeled after the Delaware
River Basin Compact, 23 in which the United States would be a
signatory. 124
120. See Pyramid Lake Task Force Final Report (Dec. 1971) (copy on file with the
Department of Water Resources).
121. H.R. 6078 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (March 15, 1971). The Bill was referred to the House
Judiciary Committee and never heard.
122. H.R. 6078 (Johnson) (March 15, 1971), S. 3703 (Bible) (June 13, 1972), S. 1202
(Laxalt) (March 17, 1975), H.R. 5694 (Johnson) (April 8, 1975), S. 668 (Laxalt) (Feb. 10,
1977), S. 1544 (Laxalt) (July 19, 1979).
123. Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961). The Delaware River Basin Compact is
between the United States and the States of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Delaware. It confers broad governmental powers on a compact commission to perform planning
functions, licensing of projects, coordination of federal, state, municipal and private water
resources programs, and protection of water quality. The United States had misgivings about
being a party to an interstate compact. However, with certain consent reservations, the Compact
was approved. See Muys, supra note 91, at 117-92.
124. See Pyramid Lake Paiute and Truckee River Settlement Act of 1985: Hearings on S.
1558 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Public Lands, Reserved Water, and Resource Conser-
vation of the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 277-81
(letter from Cecil D. Andrus to James T. McIntyre, Director, Office of Management and
Budget (May 25, 1979)) [hereinafter S. 1558 Hearings (Energy Committee)]. The letter stated:
[T]he issues addressed in the proposed Compact are of extreme importance to the
United States and the interest (sic) of the United States are not adequately recognized
or protected in the provisions of the draft. In spite of this situation, the negotiations,
format, and Congressional consent procedures followed in the proposal of this
Compact are all based on the procedures used where there is little or no Federal
interest involved. We believe that the circumstances in this matter are such that the
United States should insist upon a Federal-interstate compact of the type pioneered
by the Delaware River Basin Compact of 1961, wherein the United States is a
signatory party of equal standing with the signatory states and entitled to equal
voice in the administration of the Compact (footnote omitted).
Id. at 280.
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The administration of California Governor Jerry Brown continued
to support the Compact in principle, but the support was condi-
tional. The Resources Agency and the Governor adopted a position
which tied approval of the Compact to resolution of the Pyramid
Lake problems. In 1982, the Nevada compact Commission requested
Governor Brown to articulate the State's position. In response, the
Governor stated:
California has no interest in reopening or renegotiating the terms
of the Compact. California intends to continue to observe its
mutual understanding with the State of Nevada that we will
administer our water rights programs in accordance with the
allocations made by the Compact pending congressional ratifica-
tion. At the same time, we recognize that it would not be respon-
sible to support ratification without addressing two issues left
unresolved by the Compact. These are: [(1)] preservation of Pyramid
lake[; and (2)] maintenance of conditions in the lower Truckee River
which support the Lahontan Cutthroat Trout and Cui-ui fisheries
in the River and in Pyramid Lake for the benefit of the Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians.
Protection of these resources is a matter of national concern.
Accordingly, while California would like the Compact to become
effective, we can support congressional ratification only if the
legislation ratifying the Compact also assures adequate protection
for Pyramid Lake and for the fisheries in the Truckee River. 125
Nevada officials regarded this position as being tantamount to
de facto opposition to the Compact. Ironically however, the Brown
Administration's position bears some similarities to S. 1558, a 1985
settlement bill negotiated among the Nevada parties. This bill linked
consent to the Compact to settlement of most of the outstanding
lawsuits and implementation of various physical solutions.
F. Final Efforts in Congress: The Compact Abandoned
Three events led to renewed efforts to secure the consent of
Congress to the Compact. Some progress had been made in settle-
ment negotiations, California revised the Brown Administration's
125. Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. to Peter G. Morros, Nevada State
Engineer (Aug. 16, 1982) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
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position, and the United States Supreme Court decided Nevada v.
United States. 26
Senator Laxalt introduced S. 1558127 in 1985. S. 1558 was the
culmination of four years of intensive negotiations among the
principal Nevada water users. In the late 1970s, the Reagan Ad-
ministration encouraged settlement negotiations to resolve outstand-
ing Truckee River litigation. California was not invited to participate
in the negotiations, and it did not insist on being a party. California
officials viewed the Truckee River disputes as an internal Nevada
matter.
During these negotiations, Nevada Governor Bryan notified the
California governor that Nevada intended to proceed with legislation
to secure consent to the Compact and urged California's support.
Governor Deukmajian's reply expressed unqualified support for the
Compact, indicating that California would also support federal
funding for water conservation measures for areas served from the
Lower Truckee River.12 8 California no longer coupled its support
for the Compact with legislation providing for physical solutions.
Nevada's interest in pushing for consent legislation was heightened
after the United States Supreme Court decided Nevada v. United
States.129 During the settlement negotiations it insisted that approval
of the Compact was a sine qua non of any settlement. 130 After the
Supreme Court decision, Nevada urged California to join in seeking
early ratification of the Compact.
In July 1985, the settlement negotiations produced a working
draft of proposed legislation. The draft was introduced by Senator
Laxalt as S. 1558.131 Senator Laxalt's staff believed that a bill had
to be introduced, if legislation was to be considered in 1985.
However, there is a difference of opinion as to whether the printed
bill represented the agreement. The Nevada water users claimed that
it was agreed upon. The Tribe claimed that the bill represented an
earlier negotiating draft. 32
126. See supra notes 17 & 47 and accompanying text.
127. S. 1558, 99th Cong., Ist. Sess. (1985) (on file at the Department of Water Resources).
128. Letter from Governor Richard Bryan to Governor George Deukmajian (Feb. 14, 1984)
(on file at the Pacific Law Journal); Letter from George Deukmajian to Richard Bryan (April
13, 1984) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
129. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
130. Nevada had initially insisted that the Compact be approved before any settlement
legislation was introduced. See S. 1558 Hearing, supra note 106, at 176 (testimony of Roland
D. Xvestergard).
131. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. A companion bill, H.R. 3213 (Vucanovitch
and Reid), was introduced in the House during the second session of the 99th Congress.
132. See S. 1558 Hearings, supra note 106, at 241-49 (statement of Wilfred Shaw). The
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S. 1558 would have consisted of two titles. Title I would have
contained the settlement agreement. Title II would have provided
the consent of Congress to the Compact. Title II would have
provided Congressional consent only if a series of conditions prec-
edent in Title I occurred. Title I would have provided funding for
fish restoration programs at Pyramid Lake, and guaranteed lake
elevations. Title I would have also required the United States to
pay damages to the Tribe if Pyramid Lake water levels could not
be maintained. The bill also provided a supply of water for Reno
from Stampede Reservoir during critical drought years. However,
these provisions would become operative only if all the pending
Truckee River lawsuits were dismissed with prejudice.133 The other
provisions of Title I were conditioned upon these dismissals occur-
ring within a year.
The compromise in S. 1558 went farther toward resolution of
Truckee River disputes than any other prior or subsequent efforts
to bring peace to the River. However, its resolution of the issues
was illusory, because several major issues remained unresolved. The
parties had to agree on an OCAP for the Truckee-Carson Irrigation
District, a matter which remains in bitterly contested litigation.
They also had to agree on revised flows and operation of reservoirs
for the Truckee River. To a large degree, S. 1558 set aside the most
difficult issues for subsequent negotiations. Finally, there was no
agreement on the Compact, even though it was included in the bill.
S. 1558 accomplished one thing the states and Senator Laxalt had
wanted: hearings on the Compact. Three hearings were held during
1985. The Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs held hearings
on October 2. T1 The Senate Subcommittee of Public Lands, Re-
served Water, and Resource Conservation of the Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources held hearings on October 21.135 The
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held hearings on
October 3 on a companion bill, H.R. 3213. None of these hearings
resulted in legislation being reported out of any committee.
The settlement agreement and S. 1558 ultimately foundered over
disagreements on the California-Nevada Interstate Compact. The
Tribe referred to a later August 20 version of the settlement agreement which was different
from the printed version of S. 1558. This version appears in the testimony of the Tribe's
attorney, Michael Thorp. Id. at 278-98. Most parties sought some amendments to the bill.
133. S. 1558, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (on file at the Department of Water Resources).
Th. cases included the then pending litigation affecting the waters of the Truckee and Carson
rivers, except for three suits involving discharges from the Reno sewage treatment facilities.
134. See S. 1558 Hearings, supra note 106 and accompanying text.
135. S. 1558 Hearings (Energy Committee), supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Tribe testified that it remained opposed to congressional approval
of the Compact. 1 6 The Tribe's stated preference was to drop the
Compact from the bill. However, the Tribe would drop its oppo-
sition to the bill disclaimer if a provision were added stating that
the settlement agreement in Title I of the bill, and actions taken
pursuant to it, would take precedence over anything to the contrary
in the Compact.137
Nevada refused to consider any condition potentially limiting the
Compact. In response to a question, Governor Bryan said:
[I]n our judgment, . . . the importance of the compact, the ne-
gotiations that took more than a decade to consummate in terms
of agreement .... cannot in any way be diminished, compromised,
or altered, in my judgment, without jeopardizing the prospect of
the totality of settlement which is essentially the purpose of this
legislation. 38
The position of the Department of the Interior was ambiguous.
On the one hand, they stated that they supported ratification of
the Compact as a part of the over-all settlement.3 9 On the other,
they stated that "clarifying language" should be added to the
consent provisions requiring that the Compact be "construed in
harmony" with Title I, the Settlement Act. 40 In the other Senate
committee hearing, the U.S. Department of Justice telegraphed its
concern over the Compact more clearly. It urged amending the
consent provisions to require that the provisions of Title I would
supersede the Compact.' 41
136. The Tribe's attorney, Michael Thorp, argued that the Tribe had not been represented
in the Compact negotiations and had assumed that the Compact would include the usual
disclaimers of impact on federal and Indian rights. The Compact's binding the United States
and the Tribe would defeat efforts to save Pyramid Lake and would violate the basic tenant
of federal Indian policy that Tribes participate in governmental decisions that affect them.
The Tribe also argued that the Compact was obsolete because of intervening events, including
the Alpine decree, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Endangered Species Act.
See S. 1558 Hearings, supra note 106, at 270-276. The Compact provisions were also opposed
by the Walker River Paiute Tribe. Id. at 438-511 (statement of Elvin Willie, Jr.), and the
Washoe Tribe of Nevada and California. Id. at 521-70 (statement of A. Brian Wallace).
137. The disclaimer read: "Nothing contained in this title (consenting to the Compact)
shall be construed to prevent the implementation of any agreements that are entered into or
measures taken pursuant to Title I of this Act. The provisions of the Compact shall be
construed in a manner consistent with the purposes of Title I of this Act." Id. at 208.
138. Id. at 98-99. No California witness testified at either hearing on S. 1558. However,
California concurred in Nevada's position.
139. Id. at 137 (statement of Robert N. Broadbent).
140. Id. at 115.
141. S. 1558 Hearings (Energy Committee), supra note 124, at 73-83 (written statement of
Philip M. Brady). The Department of Justice also raised a new and rather strange argument
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The impasse over the Compact could not be broken, and S. 1558
and the entire approach to a comprehensive settlement died. The
failure of S. 1558 hardened the positions of all the parties to the
negotiations. Nevada determined to push a bill providing only for
consent to the Compact. California indicated that it would support
such a bill.
In 1986, Senator Laxalt introduced a Compact-only bill, S. 2457.142
California joined Nevada in actively supporting passage of the bill.
Senator Laxalt got the bill referred to the Senate Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on the Constitution, which held hearings on the bill on July
15, 1986.143 The testimony of the supporters and opponents of the
Compact was similar to the S. 1558 hearings the year before. The
United States was less "supportive" of the Compact. 14 In effect,
they wanted to write article XXII out of the Compact and make
all rights recognized under state law junior in priority to any federal
rights, including those perfected in the future. The Department of
the Interior was maintaining the fiction that the Reagan Adminis-
tration supported the Compact. In reality, there was little, if any
change in the fundamental objections of the United States to being
constrained by the interstate allocations.
Senator Laxalt made one last try. In September 1986, in the
waning days of the 99th Congress, he attempted a quick slam-dunk.
He amended a single sentence in a Department of Commerce
appropriation. The sentence simply stated:
Sec. 609. "The consent of Congress is hereby given to the Cali-
fornia-Nevada interstate Compact, and the United States, its agen-
cies, wards, and instrumentalities agree to be bound by its terms.'
14
This effort touched off a last minute flurry of negotiations on
disclaimer language for federal rights. One interesting concept in
that the Compact may violate the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution,
because the Compact Commission members would have jurisdiction over federal rights and
obligations but not be appointed by the President, as required by the Appointments Clause.
Id. at 82-83.
142. S. 2457, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (on file at the Department of Water Resources).
(to grant the consent of Congress to the California-Nevada interstate Compact).
143. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
144. They again stated that they support the Compact, but subject to an amendment
making the terms of the Compact subject to all present or future rights and obligations of
the United States. Another disclaimer made the Compact's allocations subject to "the avail-
ability of water from those sources after all rights to water existing on the date of enactment
of this act as well as those rights which may hereafter be decreed to the United States, its
agencies, wards, and instrumentalities have been satisfied." S. 2457 Hearings, supra note 80,
at 111 (statement of Wayne Marchant).
145. H.R. 5161, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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the efforts was a grant of authority to the Secretary to acquire
replacement water if it perfects a claim to reserved water rights.
Senator Laxalt and his staff had tried their best to put a last
minute deal together, even getting an advance funding commitment
from the Office of Management and Budget. However, Nevada
remained adamant that the Compact not be altered, and on Sep-
tember 30, the Senator withdrew the consent language from the
Continuing Resolution. He decided not to make any further efforts
to secure the consent and approval of Congress to the California-
Nevada Interstate Compact. He retired from the United States
Senate at the end of the 99th Congress.
With the failure of Senator Laxalt's efforts in 1965 and 1966 to
secure the approval of Congress, both states came to the conclusion
that the Compact was dead and further efforts to secure the
approval of Congress would be fruitless.
California has indicated on several occasions that it may bring
an original jurisdiction suit against Nevada in the United States
Supreme Court seeking an equitable apportionment of the waters
of Lake Tahoe and the Truckee and Carson Rivers. 46 It has held
off while several settlement options have been explored.
In March 1987, Interior Department officials proposed that the
United States facilitate comprehensive settlement negotiations. Aside
from alleging that the Stillwater Wildlife Area requires more water,
the 1987 efforts accomplished nothing, Essentially, the Department
of the Interior had to channel ali its efforts into the bitterly
contested OCAP litigation and Final Environmental Impact State-
ment. It had no time for settlement.
One of the problems with the 1987 effort is that the United States
tried to "facilitate" agreements without negotiating its own de-
mands, responsibilities and rights. Facilitation accomplished nothing
because so much of the Truckee River system is affected by federal
claims and projects. Until the United States again directly partici-
pates in some sort of negotiation or proceeding in which its rights
146. In the S. 2457 hearings, Senator La'xalt asked David Kennedy, Director of the
California Department of Water Resources, what the future would be if the Compact were
not approved:
Mr. Kennedy. We have given that increasing thought. We certainly do not mean to
threaten anybody, but we are now in Federal court with the Pyramid Lake Indians
and we have about concluded that our only alternative is to initiate an action in the
U.S. Supreme Court with Nevada and try to let that court determine once and for
all who owns what on these various stream systems.
S. 2427 Hearings, supra note 80, at 110.
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are quantified, or at least limited to the state where they are
exercised, there will be no certainty in this troubled interstate water
system.
IIl. THE QuEsT FOR AN INTERSTATE ALLOCATION: FUTUlRE
CHOICES
The thirteen years of interstate compact negotiations may not be
a total waste. The record is replete with statements by the water
officials of both states that they have voluntarily complied with the
Compact's allocations. 147 Fifteen years of compliance with the Com-
pact allocations indicates that they form the basis of a reasonable
equitable apportionment. The problem at this point does not seem
to be hammering out an agreement on the quantities. The difficulty
the states face is finding a way to obtain certainty as to the
allocations,'14 as to persons desiring to export water from one state
to the other,1 49 and as to the United States and Indian tribes.
The traditional view is that there are only two constitutional ways
to divide water between two or more states. One is an interstate
compact; the other is a suit brought under the original jurisdiction
of the United States Supreme Court. 50
A greater number of methods of allocations may be available.
These methods would include: (1) The traditional interstate compact,
e.g., the California-Nevada Interstate Compact; (2) the Federal
Interstate Compact, e.g., the Delaware River Basin Compact; (3)
congressional apportionment, e.g., Arizona v. California and the
Boulder Canyon Project Act;15' (4) congressionally created "com-
pacts", e.g., the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation
Planning Council; 52 (5) congressionally approved negotiated settle-
147. See, e.g., the 1979 S.W.R.C.B. Lake Tahoe Basin Report, supra note 117.
148. See Morales & Naify v. Westergard, 90 Nev. 189, 522 P.2d 1224 (1974).
149. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (holding that water is an item in
interstate commerce subject to congressional regulation, and the states may not impermissibly
restrict its export to another state).
150. See generally Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution - A
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L. J. 685 (1925); Stinson, Western Interstate Water
Compacts, 45 CALIF. L. Rv. 665 (1957) (Stinson was the first legal advisor to the Federal
Representative on the Joint California-Nevada Compact Commission); Heron, The Interstate
Compact in Transition: From Cooperative State Action to Congressionally Coerced Agreements,
60 ST. JotN's L. REy. 1 (1985).
151. 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-618 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
152. Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839839h (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
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ments, e.g., the Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act;'53
(6) administrative interstate agreements, which are not approved by
Congress; and (7) an original jurisdiction United States Supreme
Court suit. Each of these allocation mechanisms except administra-
tive agreements and a Supreme Court suit requires action by the
Congress and the President. All except administrative agreements
could be utilized with varying degrees of success to address the
Lake Tahoe, Truckee River, and Pyramid Lake controversies. Ad-
ministrative Agreements could be used to avoid related concerns
over interstate ground water basins, which do not involve federal
issues.
A. Interstate Compact Options.
1. The Traditional Interstate Compact
Article III, section 10, clause 3 of the United States Constitution
provides that "No State shall, without the consent of Congress...
enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a
foreign power." The prohibition on entering into "any agreement
or compact" appears to be absolute. However, the Supreme Court
has determined that the consent requirement applies only to those
agreements which would tend to increase the political power or
influence to the states, and thus encroach upon the full exercise of
federal authority. 54 The critical test is whether an agreement would
operate to enhance the power of a state over what it could exercise
in the absence of the agreement. 155
It is generally conceded that interstate water compacts must have
the consent of Congress, because they encroach on a number of
federal prerogatives, including commerce, navigation, flood control,
Indians, and reclamation. 156 All of these federal interests, and
probably more, can be found in the waters of Lake Tahoe, the
153. Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1261 (1982).
154. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363
(1976).
155. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978)
(interstate tax compact held not to require congressional consent because member states could
exercise the same powers in its absence).
156. See Muys, supra note 91, at 252-53.
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Truckee River, 57 and Pyramid Lake. The United States controls the
top and bottom of the system. No agreement can divide these waters
without substantially affecting federal interests, as the negotiators
of the California-Nevada Interstate Compact realized. Congressional
action is necessary for any effective agreement. As the history of
the Compact demonstrates, full participation of the federal govern-
ment and the Tribe is also essential.
Interstate Compacts can serve an important purpose not consid-
ered when the original Compact was negotiated, namely regulating
export of water from one state to another. The potential shortage
of water in Reno in the event of a severe drought has both Washoe
County and Westpac Utilities considering possible purchases or
development of water within California. The affected California
counties have demanded protection against depletion of their water
resources.
The United States Supreme Court held in Sporhase v. Nebraska158
that water was an article of interstate commerce. A state cannot
restrict the export of water to another state, absent considerations
of severe shortage. However, in Sporhase, the Court stated in dicta
that equitable apportionment decrees and interstate compacts may
restrict water within the boundaries of a state. 159 One scholar has
argued that there is a fundamental difference between equitable
apportionment which gives a preference to a resource to the residents
of states involved in the apportionment 16 0 and the negative impact
157. Except Navigability. The Truckee River was held to be non-navigable for federal
commerce purposes, because it lacked interstate linkage by water. The river dropped too
quickly with too many obstacles to carry logs or commerce between the states. Sierra Pac.
Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 681 F.2d 1134 (9th Cir. 1982).
158. 458 U.S. 944 (1982).
159. Id. at 957. The Court expressed a reluctance to "condemn as unreasonable, measures
taken by a State to conserve and preserve for its own citizens this vital resource [water] in
times of severe shortage." One example of these measures cited by the Court was:
[t]he legal expectation that under certain circumstances each state may restrict water
within its borders has been fostered over the years not only by our equitable
apportionment decrees (citation omitted) but also by the negotiation and enforcement
of interstate compacts. Our law, therefore has recognized the relevance of state
boundaries in the allocation of scarce water resources.
Id. at 956.
160. The term "equitable apportionment" has been applied almost exclusively to water.
However, in Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon and Washington, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983), the Court
held that the doctrine of equitable apportionment is applicable to anadramous fish in the
Columbia-Snake River system:
Although that doctrine has its roots in water rights litigation, see Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46, 98, 27 S. Ct. 655, 667, 51 L. ed. 956 (1907), the natural resource of
anadramous fish is sufficiently similar to make equitable apportionment an appro-
priate mechanism for resolving allocative disputes.
Id. at 1024.
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of the commerce clause on the power of states to restrict the free
interstate flow of resources.' 6'
One case, however, expressly holds that interstate movement of
water may be barred, if it is prohibited by an interstate compact.
Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Commission1 62
involved a proposal to divert water outside the Yellowstone River
Basin in violation of article X of that Compact. 163 Intake argued
that the Compact was state law which impermissibly burdened
interstate commerce. The Ninth Circuit held that the Compact was
federal law for purposes of the commerce clause. "When Congress
approved this Compact, Congress was acting within its authority to
immunize state law from some constitutional objections by con-
verting it into federal law.' 164 Thus, unless the Supreme Court
backs away from its dicta in Sporhase, it appears that an approved
interstate compact may restrict interstate commerce of water in ways
that would be impermissible under state law. This principle will
become increasingly important to apportioning the Truckee River,
in view of Reno's water problems.
While an interstate compact would bind the states and probably
eliminate any potential Sporhase problems, it would not resolve the
concerns about federal and Indian uses. A compact simply between
the states may not protect California from future federal claims for
water use in Nevada. The history of the California-Nevada Interstate
compact demonstrates that greater participation by the United States
and the Tribe is necessary to achieve an effective and complete
interstate allocation of water. The twenty year history of federal
objections to the Compact demonstrates the futility of convincing
Congress to bind the United States over the objections of Indian
tribes and federal agencies.
An interstate compact may be an ill-suited vehicle to accommodate
federal interests because of the United States' historic reluctance to
entangle federal interests with state law. Even with the participation
of Indian tribes and the United States in allocation negotiations, it
is doubtful that any agreement could be concluded in the form of
an interstate compact. It would be too difficult to accommodate
traditional notions of federal and tribal sovereignty and to subject
161. See Sims & Davis, Water Transfers Across State Systems, 31 RocKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 22-1 (1985).
162. 769 F2d 568 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986).
163. Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663 (1951).
164. 769 F.2d at 570.
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that sovereignty to an independent governmental organization cre-
ated by a bistate compact. Other forms of federal settlement leg-
islation would avoid the institutional concerns inherent in negotiating
and ratifying another interstate compact.
2. Federal Interstate Compacts
The Department of the Interior and the Tribe criticized the
California-Nevada Interstate Compact because, among other rea-
sons, they did not fully participate in its negotiation (for whatever
reasons). They also objected because they were not equally repre-
sented on the Commission that administered it. One federal com-
mentator suggested an alternative compact be negotiated and drafted
along the lines of the Delaware River Basin Compact.' 65
Two interstate compacts, the Delaware River Basin Compact, 166
and the Susquehana River Basin Compact, 67 have fully participating
federal representatives on the commissions that administer them.
Both exercise broad powers to plan, develop, and manage the river
basins for flood control, water supply, and pollution control.
The fundamental purpose of negotiating the Delaware River Basin
Compact was to overcome the overlapping and uncoordinated ad-
ministration of forty-three state agencies, fourteen interstate agen-
cies, and nineteen federal agencies having jurisdiction of some
portion of the river basin. 161 The Compact is intended to require
local, state and federal agencies to conform their projects to the
Delaware River Basin Commission's comprehensive plan. However,
consent reservations agreed upon by federal agencies and the states
make an element of the plan binding on federal agencies only when
the federal representative concurred in its adoption. In addition,
the President of the United States may suspend, modify, or delete
any provision of the plan affecting federal interests when he finds
that the national interest so requires. 169
A similar comprehensive approach could be taken to the regional
water problems of the Lake Tahoe and Truckee River Basins,
165. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (letter from Cecil Andrus to James
McIntyre).
166. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
167. Pub. L. No. 91-525, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970).
168. Muys, supra note 91, at 153.
169. Id. at 154.
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because the disputes involve some elements of water quality,' 70 flood
control, and efficient operation of existing facilities. However, if
achieving a satisfactory compromise on a comprehensive settlement
agreement was difficult, achieving the compromises necessary for
such a federal interstate compact would be almost impossible. It
would involve sovereignty compromises for all participants. In ad-
dition to the traditional federal concerns, comprehensive planning
and management of the water resources would also involve com-
promises on the states' closely guarded sovereignty over water rights
administration.17' Furthermore, the Lake Tahoe and Truckee River
problems do not involve duplication and overlap of programs, as
much as they involve the insufficiency of water to satisfy all
competing present and future demands. They do not require such
a comprehensive and complex solution. If the inter- and intrabasin
allocation problems can be resolved, existing agencies could admin-
ister the water resources without the duplication and overlap that
gave rise to the Delaware Compact.
The other model of a federal interstate compact is the Pacific
Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council.' 72
This is a "compact" cut from whole cloth by Congress. While
Congress consented to it and the states agreed to participate in it,
the legislation creating it was drafted in Congress, rather than being
negotiated among the states. 7 1 It has been upheld by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 74 but the case has been criticized as being
constitutionally suspect.' 7  If an interstate agency were deemed
necessary, one established through prior negotiations between the
States, the United States, and the Indians would be far preferable
to one created by congressional fiat.
170. The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe has several pending suits concerning wastewater
treatment in Reno. California's Lahontan Regional Water Quality Control Board is concerned
about the water quality impacts of shoreline erosion when the level of Lake Tahoe is near its
maximum.
171. Following California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), the Western states are
even more resistant to encroachments on Congress' historic deference to state water rights
administration.
172. The member states in the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Council include Washington, Oregon, Montana and Idaho. See Seattle Master Builders Ass'n
v. Pacific N.W. Elec. Power & Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1362 (9th Cir.
1986).
173. See Comment, The New Interstate Compact, a Congressional Tool: Seattle Master
Builders Ass'n. v. Pacific Northwest Electric Power 60 ST. JOHN's L. Rnv. 813, 814-15.
174. Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1371.
175. See supra note 173, at 814-15. See also Heron, supra note 150.
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B. Equitable Apportionment by the Supreme Court
The failure of the California-Nevada Interstate Compact caused
officials in both California and Nevada to refer to an original
jurisdiction lawsuit in the United States Supreme Court as the only
other option which can divide the waters of Lake Tahoe and the
Truckee and Carson Rivers between the two states.1 76
Equitable apportionment is a doctrine of federal common law
that determines the extent and limitations of two or more states'
rights to share in a common natural resource. 177 Under equitable
apportionment, the court divides interstate water so that each state
may enjoy the benefits from the use of the water. The water is
divided on the principle of fairness; each state is entitled to a just
and equitable allocation. 178 Where both states recognize the doctrine
of prior appropriation, priority becomes the "guiding principle" in
fashioning an allocation. 79 However, the courts have departed from
state law where other relevant facts made it necessary.18 0 Nebraska
v. Wyoming summarizes some of the criteria used in equitable
apportionment:
Apportionment calls for the exercise of informed judgment on a
consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the
guiding principle. But physical and climatic conditions, consump-
tive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character
and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the
availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses
on downstream areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared
to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on
the former-these are all relevant factors.'
In effect, the Court gave weight to appropriation priorities, but
they are not controlling.
176. The future of the Walker River is uncertain. There is some thinking that it could be
the subject of a separate compact or equitable apportionment lawsuit.
177. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). The doctrine was most recently explained
in Colorado v. New Mexico, (Colorado 1) 459 U.S. 176, 183-88 (1982). Except for Idaho v.
Oregon and Washington 462 U.S. 1017 (1983), the doctrine has been used only in interstate
water rights litigation.
178. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
179. Id., Wyoming v. Colorado 259 U.S. 419, 469-71 (1922). The "guiding principle" may
be less compelling in a dispute between Nevada, which recognizes only prior appropriation,
and California, which recognizes both appropriative and riparian water rights.
180. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931); Colorado I, 459 U.S. at
186-88.
181. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 618.
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In the first of two Colorado v. New Mexico decisions, 8 2 the
Court further reduced its emphasis on priority. Under strict priority,
any diversion of the Vermejo River by Colorado would have been
subject to call by senior New Mexico users. However, while rec-
ognizing the importance of protecting established uses the Court
stated:
Under some circumstances, however, the countervailing equities
supporting a diversion for future use in one state may justify the
detriment of existing users in another state. This may be the case,
for example, where the state seeking a diversion demonstrates by
clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of the diversion
substantially outweigh the harm that may result. In the determi-
nation of whether the state proposing the diversion has carried
this burden, an important consideration is whether the existing
users could offset the diversion by reasonable conservation meas-
ures to prevent waste 83
In the second Colorado v. New Mexico decision (Colorado II),184
the Court backed away from the consideration of efficiency of use
in equitable apportionment. It imposed a high standard of proof
which it found that Colorado had not met. It explained that the
clear-and-convincing standard is a high one and unique to equitable
apportionment:
The standard reflects this Court's long-held view that a proposed
diverter should bear most, though not all, of the risks of an
erroneous decision: "The harm that may result from disrupting
the established use is typically certain and immediate, whereas the
potential benefits from a proposed diversion may be speculative
and remote (citation omitted) 185
Colorado II does not represent a complete negation of the effi-
ciency concept of Colorado L While the Court did not allow a
junior appropriation in Colorado to jeopardize senior uses in New
Mexico, this result may have obtained, in part, because Colorado
had no specific plans for the water. All Colorado established was
that a steel corporation needed the water whenever it built a plant.
(The site had not been selected.) In comparison, New Mexico had
completed some long-range plans to support its claim.
Long-range planning and analysis will, we believe, reduce uncer-
tainties with which equitable apportionment judgments are made.
182. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
183. Id. at 187-88.
184. 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
185. 467 U.S. at 316.
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If New Mexico can develop evidence to prove that its existing
economy is efficiently using water, we see no reason why Colorado
cannot take similar steps to prove that its future economy could
do better. 18 6
The Court also rejected the special master's finding that the
equities were with Colorado's proposed diversion because three-
fourths of the water of the Vermejo River arises in Colorado. The
Court stated that the equitable apportionment of appropriated rights
should turn on benefits, harms, and efficiencies of competing uses.
The source of the Vermejo River's water was held to be irrelevant. 187
In other words, the area-of-origin preference carries no water with
the Supreme Court.
It is probable that an equitable apportionment of Lake Tahoe
and the Truckee River would be governed by considerations of
efficiencies and long-range planning, rather than a strict adherence
to priorities. The allocation to each state under the California-
Nevada Interstate Compact is evidence of an equitable apportion-
ment since both states have conducted their long-range planning
around their allocation, especially in the Lake Tahoe Basin. Given
the efforts made by both states to adhere to the Compact's Lake
Tahoe allocations, they are a more equitable allocation than the
results of a strict adherence to prior appropriation. Efficiencies of
use in the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District are already being
challenged in the OCAP litigation. The Truckee River system, with
its competing irrigation, fish and wildlife, domestic, municipal,
industrial, and recreational uses of water, may be a good candidate
for a reconsideration of the importance of relative efficiencies,
especially because the Newlands Project is an older system with
relatively inefficient uses of water. While the Court discussed the
various equitable apportionment principles in Colorado I, its dis-
cussion of these principles does not give a clear indication of how
they would apply to the Truckee River.
Uncertainties, in addition to the uncertain equitable apportion-
ment criteria, lurk in a Supreme Court adjudication of Lake Tahoe
and the Truckee River. In reality, the Court has equitably appor-
tioned only three river systems. 18 8 The other cases have denied
186. Id. at 322.
187. Id. at 323.
188. The North Platte River, (Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945)) the Delaware
River (New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1922)), and the Laramie River (Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922)).
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equitable apportionment because no injury was established 8 9 or
because the burden of proof had not been satisfied. 190 In requiring
proof of actual injury, the Court in effect declines to issue declar-
atory judgments. This may limit the usefulness of equitable appor-
tionment in dealing with future uses.' 9'
Another problem with equitable apportionment of the Lake Tahoe
and Truckee River system is the issue of whether the United States
is an indispensable party, unjoinable without its consent. The Court
has denied motions to bring original jurisdiction actions in instances
where the United States was an indispensable party but did not
waive sovereign immunity. 92 In State of Idaho ex rel Evans v.
Oregon and Washington,193 the Court rejected the special master's
initial finding that the United States was an indispensible party to
an equitable apportionment of the fish of the Columbia-Snake River
system. Applying the criteria for indispensible parties under Rule
19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court found that
it would be possible to fashion a decree without joinder of the
United States because Idaho's complaint did not affect operation
of federal dams or fish treaties. A similar dilemma may face an
equitable apportionment of Lake Tahoe and the Truckee River
unless the United States intervenes or the Court allows the case to
go to trial, as it did in the Idaho case. However, the uncertainties
of an equitable apportionment suit, together with its cost and
complexity, make one last settlement effort worthwhile.
C. Equitable Apportionment Through Negotiated Settlement
Legislation
S. 1558 had the earmarks of a comprehensive negotiated settle-
ment of outstanding water rights disputes concerning the waters of
Lake Tahoe, the Truckee River and, to a lesser degree, the Carson
River. Its fatal flaw was the inconsistency of the states' and the
United States' expectations concerning the interstate water allocation
189. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 296 U.S. 46 (1907); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282
U.S. 660 and Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936).
190. Colorado 11, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
191. See generally Comment, Is There a Future for Proposed Water Uses in Equitable
Apportionment Suits?, 25 NAT. REsouRcEs J., 791 (1985).
192. See Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 571-72 (1936); Texas v. New Mexico, 352
U.S. 991 (1957).
193. 444 U.S. 380 (1980).
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issue. The states expected that an equitable apportionment could be
achieved through the Compact as originally negotiated. On the
other hand, the Tribe's and the United States' expectations were
that the consent legislation would either include disclaimers to
accommodate federal claims or the settlement would proceed with-
out the Compact.
It may be possible to satisfy these expectations through a different
approach to settlement legislation. Congress' powers under the
commerce clause includes the power to regulate and apportion
interstate streams, subject only to the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. It has not done so because the history of western water
allocation has been one of deference to state water law. 194 However,
it did so once. Arizona v. California95 held that in enacting the
Boulder Canyon Project Act, Congress intended to and did appor-
tion the Lower Colorado River among California, Nevada, and
Arizona, leaving the tributaries under state jurisdiction. Accord-
ingly, the apportionment of the Lower Basin is not controlled by
the doctrine of equitable apportionment or the 1922 Colorado River
Compact.196
Negotiated settlement legislation for the Truckee River litigation
could include provisions agreed to by both states that would permit
Congress to allocate the waters of Lake Tahoe and the Truckee
River between California and Nevada. Because it would be an act
of Congress, its allocations would be secure from commerce clause
challenges under Sporhase. It would be the first Indian and federal
water rights settlement act since the Boulder Canyon Project Act
to include an interstate apportionment. 197 Other Indian water rights
disputes have been settled through agreements which have either
been ratified' 98 or are still pending before Congress. 199 Settlements
can work, if they are voluntary and consensual.
Negotiated settlement of water rights disputes can provide a
flexible process which can accommodate some or all of the major
194. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
195. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
196. Id. at 565-66.
197. The Boulder Canyon Project Act did not quantify Indian rights, but the Court held
that Indian and federal uses of mainstream water in a state are to be charged against that
state's apportionment. Id. at 601.
198. See, e.g., Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
293, 96 Stat. 1274 (1982).
199. See, e.g., S. 795, 100th Cong., 2d Sess, (1988) (the San Luis Rey Indian Water Rights
Settlement Act).
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concerns of the major parties. They can be tailored to fit the facts
and circumstances of each dispute. The inherent flexibility of a
negotiated settlement allows it to better accommodate federal and
tribal sovereignty. Any successful negotiation must include partici-
pation and funding by the United States, because of its responsi-
bilities and its participation in reclamation projects. While financial
participation by others may be included in a settlement, 200 the federal
government must bear a large percentage if the necessary funding
to implement a settlement agreement. Increasingly, the western states
are supporting the concept of negotiated settlements with full federal
participation in the negotiations and funding of solutions. 201
One guiding principle, however, should be that federal and Indian
uses be charged to the state where the uses are made. 20 2 From
California's perspective, such a principle would be essential to
protect its allocation, which, under the Compact, was less than ten
percent of the total flow of the Truckee River.
There are several major drawbacks to negotiated settlements. One
is that, after the agreement is negotiated, legislation often must be
enacted by Congress. At this point, the deal can unravel if any
party attempts to get more than the original bargain. Even if all
parties concur, others may seek modifications not negotiated or
agreed to by the parties. 203 Another drawback is that a settlement
bill does not provide as much certainty as a Supreme Court decree
or an interstate compact. Congress may unilaterally amend or repeal
it. On the other hand, Congress may also rescind its approval of
an interstate compact. Equitable apportionment decrees may be
reopened. Certainty in interstate allocations may be relative.
200. The State of Nevada had agreed to contribute $8 million to the S. 1558 settlement.
201. See, e.g., Resolution of the Western States Water Council Supporting Negotiated
Settlements of Indian Water Rights Disputes (April 11, 1986) (copy on file with the Department
of Water Resources). The Western Governors Association has also supported the approach of
negotiated settlements. See Resolution of July 7, 1987 (copy on file with the Department of
Water Resources).
202. See Tarlock, One River, Three Sovereigns: Indian and Interstate Water Rights, 22
LAND & WATER L. REv. 631, 653, 670 (1987). Tarlock argues that Indian water rights should
be treated as water allocated to another state by an interstate Compact. They' should be
assigned to the state in which the reservation exists, and state-created water rights should be
subordinated to Indian water rights, just as state-created water rights are subordinated to
interstate compact allocations. See Hinderlinder v. La Plata & Cherry Creelk Ditch Co., 304
U.S. 92 (1938).
203. For example, the San Luis Rey Indian Water Rights Settlement Act provides some
federal Central Valley Project water as a part of the package. It would be transported to the
reservations near San Diego via the California Aqueduct and the Metropolitan Water District
facilities. This provision is opposed by CVP users in the San Joaquin Valley who fear that
this agreement may create a precedent.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Truckee River is a relatively small interstate river, compared
with those involved in many other interstate water disputes, but it
has had more than its share of litigation and controversy. It is
probable that few other interstate rivers have had as much federal
involvement in the origins of intra- and interstate disputes. The
United States created both the Pyramid Lake Reservation and the
Newlands Project, and it regulates Lake Tahoe. It authorized and
constructed the Washoe Project to provide additional water supplies.
Over the years, expectations backed by conflicting legal theories
have arisen over the waters of this interstate system, and the
expectations and theories far exceed the amount of water available
from the system. Most problems have arisen because the water
necessary to fully satisfy a particular set of expectations is not
available, except at the expense of another set of expectations. The
United States has fostered some of these expectations through the
construction and operation of water projects and through expressed
or implied promises of water. In sum, it did not have enough water
for all its constituencies.
Resolving the disputes will take the full participation of the federal
government, both with respect to clarifying its responsibilities to
the various water users and to providing financing for physical
solutions to make the Truckee River supply serve as many uses as
possible. The history of the Compact underscores the futility of
attempting to resolve the problems of Lake Tahoe and the Truckee
River without the full participation of the United States. It can
only be hoped that the necessary federal leadership and cooperation
will be forthcoming, as it has not always been in the past.
The best hope for bringing peace to the river would be a com-
prehensive negotiated settlement. The interstate allocations could be
negotiated or litigated separately from the other problems, but in
the past they have been unavoidably linked to other issues. A
comprehensive negotiated settlement would offer the best opportu-
nity for more flexible resolution of the system's interrelated prob-
lems. Over the years, litigation has resolved a few issues, but it has
not brought certainty. 1988 is the diamond jubilee of the Conser-
vation Commission's recommendation that the waters of Lake Tahoe
be equitably apportioned. Perhaps it is time for a new attempt.
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